Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study by Sichelman, Ted & Graham, Stuart J.H.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1
2010
Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study
Ted Sichelman
University of San Diego School of Law
Stuart J.H. Graham
Georgia Institute of Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the
Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ted Sichelman & Stuart J. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 111
(2010).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol17/iss1/3
PATENTING BY ENTREPRENEURS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Ted Sichelman *
Stuart J.H. Graham**
Cite as: Ted Sichelman and Stuart J.H. Graham,
Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 111 (2010),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/Sichelman&Graham.pdf
INTRODUCTION
The classical theory of patents posits that society grants to inventors,
in Thomas Jefferson's words, "the embarrassment of an exclusive pat-
ent," because doing so may provide socially beneficial economic
incentives to create what would be otherwise lacking absent legal
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protection.' In particular, if there were not an exclusionary right protect-
ing intellectual creations, again in Jefferson's words, "the moment [the
creation] is divulged, it [would] force[] itself into the possession of every
one," and the inventor would have no means to earn a suitable profit
from the creation.2 Moving one step backwards, without the potential for
profit afforded by a patent right, inventors-at least those driven by the
desire for financial gain-might not have a sufficient incentive to invent.
Beginning in the late 19th century, however, economists began to
perceive other important uses for patents. For example, in 1896, the
economist A.T. Hadley argued that the patent system "has established
itself, not primarily as a stimulus for invention or disclosure," but as a
driver of the investment of capital in the use and development of pre-
existing inventions.? In this view, patents provide substantial ex post in-
centives to commercialize inventions, rather than merely ex ante
incentives to invent.
In the late 20th century, several important empirical studies of pri-
marily large companies revealed other widespread uses of patents,
especially for so-called "strategic" reasons. First, many large firms have
built large patent portfolios, furthering their strategic goal of cross-
licensing with competitors to avoid mutually destructive patent litiga-
tion.? When negotiating these cross-licenses, one standard practice in
determining the value of each side's patent portfolio is simply to count
up the total number of patents each side owns.6 Of course, this may en-
gender a sort of arms-race mentality for patenting, with large firms
acquiring more and more patents to maintain leverage at the negotiating
table. Indeed, the so-called "flood" in patenting over the last few decades
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac M'Pherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING His AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS,
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 175, 181 (H.A. Wash-
ington ed., Washington, D.C., Taylor & Maury 1854); cf Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (W.D. Nordhaus ed., 1962) (noting the disin-
centives to disclose novel information and knowledge in the absence of legal protection to
prevent the use of such information and knowledge).
2. Id. at 180.
3. ARTHUR TWINNING HADLEY, ECONOMICS 134 (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons
1896); see also ALBERT F. RAVENSHEAR, THE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL INFLUENCE OF
THE ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM 52 (1908) ("[The final conclusion is that patents exercise a net
influence in stimulating the growth of industry .... 9").
4. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
5. See infra Part I.C.
6. See Peter Tennent, IP Counsel, Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., Theory and Practice of
Patent Valuation, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology 7 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/patent-valuation/schedule.htm.
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has been partially attributed to cross-licensing races.' Second, patents
have become valuable tools in defending against patent infringement
suits.' If a defendant accused of infringement can threaten suit against
the plaintiff, the mutual threat can raise the stakes for both parties, mak-
ing it more likely that suits settle, or never happen in the first place.
Third, firms are engaging in "preemptive" patenting to prevent others
from encroaching on their technological "space" with competing prod-
ucts.9 Even more recently, legal theorists have posited that patents can
play an important role in "signaling" the value of a firm's technology
and inventiveness, both externally to the market and internally to manag-
ers. Several studies have reported these effects, especially among startup
and early-stage companies seeking to use patents to attract financing and
to improve their chances of being acquired or going public."o
Thus, since Jefferson's time, our understanding of the use and effects
of patents has become more varied and nuanced. Although a large body
of empirical work has emerged documenting these alternative uses
among large, publicly traded firms, there have been few studies of
smaller, early-stage firms. Nonetheless, commentators and policymakers
have come to radically differing conclusions. Some surmise that patents
stand in the way of entrepreneurial activity." Others suggest that strong
patent protection is essential to the survival of young firms in competi-
tive markets--especially in industries with large incumbents, which
typically enjoy advantages in sales, marketing, and access to capital.1
This latter notion has tended to dominate in the last several decades,
partly spurring the expansion of patent rights since the creation in 1982
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears essentially
7. See Rick S. Nathan, Valuation of Software Inventions: What Are They Worth in
Economic Terms?, SD35 ALl-ABA 145, 164 (1998) ("Today, software firms are filing patent
applications in increasing numbers, as companies recognize the need to protect their intellec-
tual assets and leverage cross-licensing opportunities."); cf Michael J. Meurer, Business
Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & Pot'Y 309, 327 (2002) (noting that
cross-licensing arrangements may mitigate the negative effects of "patent floods").
8. See infra Part I.E.
9. See infra Part I.G.
10. See infra Part I.D.
11. See, e.g., Brad Burnham, Software Patents Are the Problem Not the Answer, UNION
SQUARE VENTURES (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.unionsquareventures.com/2010/02/software-
patents-are-the-problem-not-the-answer.php; Jason Mendelson, 76% of Venture Capitalists
Believe that Software Patents are Important (NOT!), MENDELSON'S MUSINGS (May 6, 2010),
http://www.jasonmendelson.com/wp/archives/2010/05/76-of-venture-capitalists-believe-that-
patents-are-important-not.php.
12. See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 REs. POL'Y 273, 274 (1998) ("A
significant share of the recent arguments in favor of strong patent protection focuses on the
importance of patents for new entrants, or small firms ... and stresses functions of patents that
are often different from those presumed in the empirical studies [of large firms].").
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all appeals involving patent infringement claims." Moreover, discerning
the drivers of patenting by entrepreneurs is especially topical given the
importance of these firms to innovation and the overall economy. Be-
cause evidence suggests that startup and early-stage firms are more
innovative per research and development (R&D) dollar than large firms,
they may account for a disproportionately large share of U.S. productiv-
ity and employment growth in recent decades.14
Because of these important concerns, the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation-an organization that studies and promotes entrepreneurship
in the United States-funded an effort at the University of California,
Berkeley School of Law, to undertake the first comprehensive survey of
the relationship between patenting and entrepreneurship in the United
States. The authors, along with other investigators,'- administered the
survey in 2008 to approximately 15,000 startup and early-stage compa-
nies in the biotechnology, medical device, information technology (IT)
hardware, and software and Internet sectors. A portion of the survey ex-
amined why entrepreneurs, startups, and early-stage companies do (and
do not) seek patents.
This Article reports and analyzes results from that survey, showing
that several widespread beliefs about startup firm patenting practices are
very likely wrong. In brief, like the surveys of large firms, our respon-
dents that hold patents report that the main motivation for patenting is to
prevent others from copying their products and services. This result
holds-and is statistically valid-across a variety of company character-
istics, including firm age, revenues, industry, and patent portfolio size.
Because we find that many young technology companies are holding
patents, our results offer evidence that is somewhat at odds with fre-
13. See id.
14. See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lemer, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital
to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 682 (2000); ZOLTAN J. Acs & DAVID B. AUDRETSCH,
INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 19-24 (1990); John Bound et al., Who Does R&D and Who
Patents?, in R & D, PATENTS, AND PRODUCTIVITY 21, 38-39 & 51-52 (Zvi Griliches ed.,
1984); see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 74-94 (Red-
vers Opie trans., 1983) (pointing to the role that entrepreneurial innovation plays in driving
competition).
15. These investigators include Professors Robert Merges and Pamela Samuelson, Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley School of Law, and Robert Barr, Executive Director of the
Berkeley Center for Law & Technology.
16. In a separate article, we report a variety of results of the survey unrelated to the
drivers of startup patenting, including the role of patenting in securing financing and driving
innovation, the value of patents in appropriating profits from innovation, and the prevalence of
inbound licensing of patents. See Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson &
Ted Sichelman, High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008
Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255 (2010) [hereinafter Graham et al., High
Technology Entrepreneurs].
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quently cited anecdotal reports that startups, especially in the software
and Internet industries, generally do not use patents to protect against the
erosion of their profits." We offer one important caveat, however. A sub-
stantial fraction of young firms are apparently opting out of the patent
system altogether, and this observation is particularly true of companies
in the software and Internet sectors." That said, our findings suggest that
patent holding, and the strategic use of patents, is more widespread-
even among young software and Internet companies-than commenta-
tors have previously reported.
Additionally, we find-consistent with anecdotal reports-that many
startups rely heavily on patents as signals to the market to improve their
chances of raising financing, being acquired, and going public. Our re-
sults greatly contrast with previous large-firm studies, however, which
showed relatively little reliance on patents for these kinds of signaling.
Indeed, our results show that as the patent-holding firms in our sample
become older and larger, they tend to rely less on patents as signals. This
finding is also important because it lends some empirical support-
which had been lacking-for the alternative signaling theories of pat-
ents, especially for younger startups.
Like large firms, our respondents that hold patents report engaging
in strategic patenting to help defend against patent infringement suits
and to increase negotiating power, possibly for cross-licensing with other
firms. Recognizing that startups-and not just those in the biotechnology
field-find the strategic use of patents important is a novel finding.
Nonetheless, we show that these young technology companies are espe-
cially sensitive to the costs of acquiring and enforcing patents, which-
at nearly $40,000 per patent-are roughly double the reported average
for all patentees.2" Thus, even though startup firms are well aware of the
strategic uses of patents, resource constraints may mean that fewer of
them can engage in these strategies as compared with large incumbents.
To the extent that strategic patenting is positively related to firm success
and survival, we highlight this finding as a policy concern deserving of
further study, especially in industries-like electronics-with large
numbers of incumbents engaging in similar strategic patenting.
17. See infra Part II.B. .
18. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1276-79.
19. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 641-42 (2002) (setting
forth a theory of patents based on their "signaling value"); Paul J. Heald, Transaction Costs
and Parent Reform, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 455 (2007) ("The
information provided by the publication of all patents also indirectly helps in the difficult task
of valuation and pricing by providing a central clearinghouse of information on innovation.").
20. See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
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Part I of this Article explores the variety of theories of entrepreneurs'
patenting practices offered in the literature. Part II describes previous
empirical studies, primarily of large firms, as well as the anecdotal ac-
counts of the drivers of decisions to patent and to forgo patenting in
entrepreneurial firms. Part III describes the design of the 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey, its sample set, and respondent characteristics. Part IV pre-
sents the major results related to the decision to patent (or not), with
particular attention to how these results differ across company character-
istics, such as industry, age, patent portfolio size, and revenue, among
others. We conclude with some brief reflections on the policy implica-
tions of our findings.
I. THEORIES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL PATENTING
Scholars have investigated and proposed numerous theories for why
inventors and their companies decide (or not) to file for patents on their
inventions.' In a previous article, we surveyed in detail the relatively
scant literature on why entrepreneurs and startup companies file for and
forgo patents.22 As background to the results presented here, we briefly
review these theories of entrepreneurial patenting.23
A. Earning Supernormal Profits
The usual explanation for why individuals and firms, of whatever
size, file for patents is to sell their products and services at prices greater
than their competitors or to cut production and similar costs in ways
competitors will be precluded from replicating.24 This explanation de-
rives from the fundamental tenet of intellectual property theory-that
without incentives beyond those offered by the free market, potential
innovators will not innovate, because competitors and third parties
would otherwise free ride off their innovations. This explanation sup-
21. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1071-90 (2008) (surveying the dominant theories of patenting and
forgoing patenting).
22. See id.
23. The remainder of this section is adapted from a portion of Graham & Sichelman,
supra note 21, at 1071-90.
24. Supernormal profits may arise through either an increase in price or a decrease in
the cost of producing the good or service. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 298 (2002); W.D.
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNO-
LOGICAL CHANGE (1969); JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES § 2.15 (2007).
25. See Arrow, supra note 1, at 609. Alternatively, or in addition, an innovator might
consider other legal options, such as trademark, copyright, and trade secret, or non-legal op-
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ports the notion that, in some circumstances, the patenting inventor will
be able to supply products at a price higher than the competitive market
would otherwise bear, as long as other technology providers cannot sup-
ply non-infringing products that are perfect substitutes.26 In contrast to
established companies, startup and early-stage technology companies
may be subject to a different cost-benefit scheme when deciding to file
for a patent. First, unlike mature companies, startups will tend to have
fewer revenue streams to protect or production costs to cut, which can
21
make the benefit of a patent seem remote. Second, because startups
may be R&D specialists-doing less sales and marketing in their early
life-they may invent a diverse set of potential and not yet marketable
products in a short period of time. This tendency of startups to produce
embryonic ideas may make the cost of patenting each invention high
relative to the uncertainty of a market payoff, especially when compared
with the patenting decisions of large firms insofar as they tend to spend
more time improving existing products rather than inventing new ones.28
Third, young companies usually have very limited IP budgets,2 9 and al-
though there has been a recent influx of contingent-fee attorneys who
represent small- and medium-sized entities in patent litigation in return
for a percentage of any damage or settlement award, post-dot-coin,
tions, such as increased marketing expenditures, to increase its potential profits. See, e.g., H.
JACKSON KNIGHT, PATENT STRATEGY FOR RESEARCHERS AND RESEARCH MANAGERS 36-38
(2nd ed. 2001) (providing advice to company managers on the use of copyrights, trademarks.
and trade secrets to protect innovations).
26. See generally Peter L. Swan, Market Structure and Technological Progress: The
Influence of Monopoly on Product Innovation, 84 Q.J. EcON. 627, 628-29 (1970) (discussing
the introduction of perfect and imperfect substitutes to a monopolist-controlled technology
market).
27. See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83
TEx. L. REV. 961, 985 (2005) ("Because [small] firms do not yet have a product, they have no
opportunity for revenues. Thus, the benefits they reap from excluding competitors are minimal
at best.").
28. See, e.g., JESSICA LIVINGSTON, FOUNDERS AT WORK: STORIES OF STARTUPS' EARLY
DAYS 154 (2007).
29. See Mann, supra note 27, at 982-84 (describing how startup firms must allocate
money between products and patents and often choose less effective forms of patent protection
including provisional applications in order to save money for product development).
30. See Michelle Armond, Comment, Introducing the Defense of Independent Invention
to Motions for Preliminary Injunctions in Patent Infringement Lawsuits, 91 CAL. L. REV. 117,
123-24 (2003), Emily Barker, The One that Got Away?, AM. LAW., Nov. 1995, at 16, David
Rubenstein, Contingency Patent Lawyer Fills Unique Niche: To Some He's a Hero, to Others
He's No Better than an Extortionist, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1994, at 3.
Additionally, when small firms sue large firms, Gwendolyn Ball and Jay Kesan have
shown that they litigate their disputes to judgment more often than when they sue small- or
medium-sized firms. See Gwendolyn G. Ball & Jay P. Kesan, Transaction Costs and Trolls:
Strategic Behavior by Individual Inventors, Small Firms, and Entrepreneurs in Patent Litiga-
tion (Univ. of Ill. Law & Econ. Paper Series, Research Paper No. LEO9-005, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1337166. Given the high costs of such cases, Ball and Kesan infer
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there are few law firms willing to file patents on a long-term, fee-
deferred basis or in return for equity.3' Thus, startups may face much
greater barriers when filing patent applications on their inventions than
their incumbent counterparts.
B. Generating Licensing Revenues
Not all inventors develop and commercialize their inventions. An-
other common rationale for patenting is to generate revenue in the form
of licenses or royalties from authorized third parties and damage awards
in patent litigation from unauthorized ones. The rationale behind effi-
cient markets suggests that such licensing will be beneficial when a
company can earn more by licensing its patented invention, or is other-
wise incapable of fulfilling all of the market demand for its patented
products and services. For instance, the company may not have the
wherewithal to sell its products overseas, lacking sufficient production or
distribution capabilities, and may find the value proposition superior un-
der the licensing model.
While companies currently commercializing their patents may opt to
32
pursue a licensing option, a paucity of know-how, resources, or interest
to commercialize patents may be more common among startups and in-
dependents." Notably, in contrast to some foreign regimes, the U.S.
patent system has no "working" requirement-just as the owner of a
piece of fertile farmland may plant crops himself, lease it out to a tenant,
or leave it fallow. 4
A licensing option is also aided by the remedies available in patent
law, particularly when the patentee has no intent to commercialize the
invention. The threat of damages and, typically, injunctive relief, is a
that such results "could only be possible if there exists some mechanism-like contingency
fee lawyers-which helps small parties overcome the high costs of litigation." Id. at 20.
31. Based on the experience of one of the authors as a founder of a software startup and
a practicing lawyer, although law firms regularly deferred fees and were paid in equity during
the dot-com era, this is no longer the case.
32. One scholar postulates that small firms use patent disclosures as a form of market-
ing to attract licensing interest from larger firms. See Wolfgang Gick, Little Firms and Big
Patents: A Model of Small-Firm Patent Signaling, 17 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 913
(2008). Unfortunately, there has been no robust empirical study of how often potential users of
a patented technology approach patentees for licenses based on reviewing patent disclosures.
33. There is a third form of licensing as well--cross-licensing-which we discuss in
the next section. See infra Part I.C.
34. Compare, e.g., The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code § 83(a) (1999) (setting
forth a working requirement under Indian patent law), with Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) (rejecting the argument that the failure to license would
result in a loss of statutory rights and noting that such a position "runs contrary to the long-
settled view [under U.S. law] that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others
from profiting by the patented invention").
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proverbial club useful in securing license fees and other payments from
actual and potential infringers. Also, because of the high costs and sub-
stantial uncertainty36 of patent litigation, alleged infringers will often
take a license even when they believe they would win in court.
Thus, there are ample incentives for companies to patent so as to
generate license fees from third parties. One kind of small firm licensor
is the so-called "patent troll," usually described as an entity that sells no
products and performs no R&D, instead earning its profits through li-
censing or damages awarded in infringement suits. 9 On a pessimistic
view, these sorts of licensors are akin to patent slumlords.4 On another
view, they are merely "non-practicing entities" (NPEs) that perform
valuable R&D that is brokered and commercialized by others. Whatever
one's view, over the past ten years or so these entities have significantly
increased their licensing and litigation activity, in what some observers
contend is an abusive fashion. 41 For those small companies whose
35. Litigating a patent case through trial costs on the order of $3-6 million. See AM.
INTELL. PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 32 (2009) [hereinafter Eco-
NOMIC SURVEY].
36. Arguably, uncertainty is especially high with lay juries deciding complex techno-
logical questions of fact. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Improving Patent Jury Trials, in PLI's
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 1998, at 81 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 532, 1998) ("The very
unpredictability of jury verdicts not only undermines opinion letters, but discourages license
agreements and design-arounds, and multiplies litigation-with attendant costs in money,
disruption and delay."). A recent study found that about 30% of district court decisions in
patent infringement cases are overturned for faulty interpretations of the patent claims by
(typically lay) judges and that greater judicial experience with patent suits does not, on aver-
age, decrease a judge's reversal rate. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?: An
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV.
223, 249, 252-55 (2008).
37. Even if a patentee has the know-how or wherewithal to practice its patents, for the
reasons mentioned above, it may be more profitable to license and enforce them. An empirical
study by Joshua Gans, David Hsu, and Scott Stem finds that firms "with [intellectual property
rights] are estimated to be 23 percentage points more likely than nonpatentholders to pursue a
cooperative [i.e., licensing] strategy." Joshua S. Gans et al., When Does Start-Up Innovation
Spur the Gale of Creative Destruction?, 33 RAND J. ECON. 571, 572 (2002).
38. A growing literature examines the role of patents in facilitating technology transfer
in the markets for technology, but these markets cannot exist without willing technology pro-
viders and an IP rights enforcement mechanism. See ASHISH ARORA, ANDREA FOSFURI &
ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA, MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND
CORPORATE STRATEGY (2001).
39. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Introductory Note to Brief of Amicus Curiae in eBay v.
MercExchange, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 997, 997 (2006) (noting "non-producing, non-
research and development performing patent holders" are often referred to as "patent trolls").
40. Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15 TEX. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 387, 405 (2007); see also Peter Lattman, Innovative Invention Company or
Giant Patent Troll?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG, (Nov. 12, 2007, 9:04 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/l1/12/innovative-invention-company-or-giant-patent-troll/.
41. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REv. 1991, 2009 (2007) (arguing that awarding "patent trolls" injunctive remedies
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primary business is selling products or services, patent litigation and li-
censing can be difficult to undertake because of the substantial resources
and time required to mount a lawsuit.4 2 Conversely, although the empiri-
cal data are limited, relatively cash-poor startups may be less likely to be
subject to infringement suits from NPEs.43
C. Developing an Arsenalfor Cross-Licensing
Using another military metaphor-which, incidentally, is used fre-
quently among IP practitioners"-patentees that hold a well-stocked
arsenal of patents are often in a strong bargaining position. The genesis
of Microsoft's march into the top three in total yearly U.S. patent grants
is telling. 45 As a knowledgeable IP lawyer recounts:
[I]n 1993 Microsoft only held 24 patents and was struggling
with IBM over software licensing. When the two companies
could not come to terms, IBM wielded a portfolio of over 1,000
patents as a strong-arm tactic to get Microsoft to the table. Ana-
lysts said Microsoft eventually had to ante up an estimated $20-
30 million in patent licensing fees. In the wake of this, Bill
Gates told financial analysts "Our goal is to have enough patents
to be able to take and exchange intellectual property with other
companies." As of October 2000, Microsoft held 1,391 patents. 46
distorts the economic purpose of the patent system); John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent
Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 Thx. L. REv. 2111 (2007) (criticizing Lemley and Shapiro's
theoretical model, empirical data, and policy recommendations); Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Reply, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEx. L. REv. 2163 (2007) (critiquing
Golden's response); Steven Levy, Changes in Patents May Be Pending, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12,
2007, at 19; Joe Nocera, Tired of Trolls, a Feisty Chief Fights Back, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2006, at Cl; Tracey Steiner & Stephen Guth, Beware Patent Trolls, MGMT. Q., Sept. 22, 2005,
at 38.
42. As noted earlier, contingent-fee attorneys can substitute for a patentee's own litiga-
tion war chest, but presumably many small companies focused on product development and
sales are either not particularly interested in mounting contingent-fee lawsuits or simply do
not have access to contingent-fee attorneys.
43. Cf Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1317-18 (find-
ing that a relatively low percentage of startups license-in patents solely to avoid a lawsuit).
44. For instance, one of the authors recently heard a well-known patent broker refer to
himself as an "arms dealer." Statement by Northern California Patent Broker to Ted Sichel-
man, in Berkeley, Cal. (Feb. 6, 2009).
45. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS 2009,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/topo_09.pdf.
46. ANTHONY L. MIELE, PATENT STRATEGY: THE MANAGER'S GUIDE TO PROFITING
FROM PATENT PORTFOLIOS 40 (2001) (recounting the 1993 IBM-Microsoft licensing negotia-
tions).
As of August 2010, Microsoft has been granted 15,836 patents, 47 has
acquired many others, and has sealed numerous cross-licensing deals 4 -
arguably realizing Bill Gates's ambition "to take and exchange intellec-
tual property with other companies."49
Yet, Microsoft's weak position vis-A-vis IBM in 1993 likely typifies
most startup companies' inability to negotiate with more established ri-
vals. Insofar as startups may lack the capital to acquire patent arsenals,
they will be disadvantaged relative to larger incumbents in cross-
licensing deals.o An incumbent's ability to gain access on very favorable
terms through a cross-license to the startup's innovative technology-
which the incumbent may be able to market and sell more effectively
than the startup-will build upon the already strong incentives for the
incumbent to grow its patent portfolio to maintain low cross-licensing
costs with other incumbents." Collectively, these strategies may create or
exacerbate patent thickets-erecting barriers to entry and possibly favor-
ing entrenched incumbents.52
47. This number resulted from a search for "Microsoft" as assignee on the U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office's website. See Patent Full-Text Databases, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/patft/index.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2010).
48. Cross-licensing Deals-Google Search, GOOGLE, http://www.google.comlsearch?
source= ig&hl=en&rlz=&=&q=cross-licensing+deals&btnG=Google+Search (search of term
"cross-licensing deals" on Google resulting in a high number of "Microsoft" hits) (last visited
Aug. 3, 2010).
49. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 31-43 (2005) (discussing the benefits of aggregating patents into large portfo-
lios).
50. Indirect support for this assertion is Bronwyn Hall's finding that the average eco-
nomic value of a patent held by publicly traded entrants in complex product industries was
higher than incumbents for a sample of electrical and mechanical firms. See Bronwyn H. Hall,
Exploring the Patent Explosion (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10605,
2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0605. This finding suggests that incumbents
in complex product industries-which are exactly those known to file large numbers of pat-
ents for cross-licensing purposes-are digging deeper into the technological well, so to speak,
to file for patents.
51. Most of the companies that are the top patent holders in the United States are large
incumbents that are highly active in cross-licensing deals. See Graham & Sichelman, supra
note 21, at 1066 & n. 11; David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implica-
tions for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL'Y 285 (1986)
(discussing the benefits of complementary assets, such as marketing power, in appropriating
value from innovation). In this regard, Jean Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman show that pat-
ents held by small firms are more likely to be litigated than ones by large firms, consistent
with the notion that small firms are not engaging in out-licensing to the same extent as large
firms. See Jean 0. Lanjouw & Marik Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights:
Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 37 JL. & EcON. 45 (2004).
52. See generally Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Cri-
tique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2004).
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D. Securing Investment and Financing
Implementing a patented technology may yield greater revenues or
lower expenses in the provision of products and services. Another means
for startups to generate cash is to raise capital through borrowing or
fundraising, and patents can play an important role here as well." First,
scholars have shown that intensive patenting by acquisition targets is
associated with increases in purchase prices.-" Other research indicates
that similar effects increase IPO share prices.55 Second, researchers have
found that intensive patenting by venture-backed companies in the soft-
ware and biotechnology sectors is associated with greater total
investment, total number of financing rounds, and firm longevity, though
it remains unresolved whether increased patenting causes, or is merely
correlated with, these events." Third, patents can function as valuable
53. See Jesper Lindgaard Christensen, The IPR System, Venture Capital and Capital
Markets-Contributions and Distortions of Small Firm Innovation? (Druid Working Paper No.
08-03, 2008), available at http://www.business.aau.dk/wp/08-03.pdf (reviewing much of the
relevant literature on the topic).
54. See David Hsu & Rosemarie Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for Entrepreneu-
rial Ventures (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Mack Ctr. for Technological
Innovation working paper series), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/-bhhall/e222spring07
files/HsuZiedonis07_PatentSignaling-abstables.pdf (finding that a doubling in the patent
stock of venture-backed semiconductor companies leads to a 24% premium in market valua-
tion); see also Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, Patent Protection, Takeovers, and
Startup Innovation: A Dynamic Approach (Ctr. for Mkt. and Pub. Org. Working Paper No.
08/201, 2008), available at http://www.epip.euL/conferences/epip03/papers/Panagopoulos-ip-
aug08v2-sw.pdf (providing an economic model wherein "positive but not excessive IP protec-
tion" leads to increased acquisitions of startup firms by incumbents, thereby increasing overall
innovation).
55. lain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Patents, Thickets, and the Financing of
Early-Stage Firms: Evidence from the Software Industry (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W13644, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3lpapers.cfm-
?abstract-id=1037168; see also Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 54, at 2 (finding that semiconduc-
tor "[startups] with larger numbers of patent applications are more likely to exit successfully
through an initial public offering (IPO)").
56. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software
Start-ups (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 057, 2006), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=802806 (finding a significant
correlation between patenting activity and total financing as well as the number of rounds
of financing, but acknowledging that they could not determine whether increased patenting
caused increased financing); Carolin Haeussler et al., To Be Financed or Not-The Role of
Patents for Venture Capital Financing (CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7115, 2009), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1393725 (finding that the rate
of patenting among German and British biotechnology firms is correlated with the timing
of venture capital investment); Paul H. Jensen et al., Innovation, Technological Conditions
and New Firm Survival (Melbourne Inst. Working Paper No. 16/06, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=946827 (finding among Australian
startup firms that increased patenting is correlated with firm survival rates); David B.
Audretsch et al., Financial Signalling by Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs (CEPR Discus-
sion Paper No. DP7165, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1345692 (finding that patenting increases the likelihood of external financing);
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hard assets, either in securing loans or by increasing a company's valua-
tion upon liquidation."
One reason why patents may be important in garnering investment
and financing is that they can signal a company's ability to earn super-
normal profits or to reduce production costs. Yet, some startup
executives, especially those in software companies, contend that patents
provide no particular benefit other than a merely "optical" one for poten-
tial investors." These views suggest that although patents may have no
intrinsic value for the company that owns them, they can provide an ex-
trinsic value to outsiders estimating the company's worth.
There are several ways of explaining this apparent paradox. One
possible explanation is that investors, banks, lawyers, and other outsiders
conducting due diligence on startups have only a limited amount of time
and resources to assess the value of the startup. Although the patents
may be of no particular value for the given startup under consideration,
because patents can increase profitability for many other companies, the
outsiders nonetheless attribute some value to the patents. On a more san-
guine view, the patents may serve as a proxy for internal firm resources
that are otherwise difficult to quantify or may signal to outsiders that the
company is engaging in the sorts of practices that successful companies
generally conduct. For example, the wherewithal a company has to file
for patents could signal to investors that it has the "discipline and techni-
cal expertise" to "codify [otherwise] tacit knowledge," which acts as a
form of insurance against a "brain drain" of the company's valuable
know-how if key engineers were to leave.59 Yet another explanation is
that managers, unlike investors, are incorrect in their poor value
assessments, not comprehending the high actual value of patents to their
Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 55, at 41 (finding that "patents significantly affect the
likelihood of obtaining funding for early-stage firms"); see also Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra
note 12, at 276 ("The collection of small and medium sized firms in the American biotechnol-
ogy industry is, of course, a striking example of enterprises that would not have come into
existence without the prospect of a patent, and which depend on patent protection to make
their profits, and to attract capital, through one or another of these strategies."); cf Kortum &
Lerner, supra note 14 (examining patenting by venture-backed firms and postulating a strong
causal relationship between venture capital funding and the rate of patenting).
57. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 775, 786 (2008) [hereinafter Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation] (noting the poten-
tially high value of a strong intellectual property portfolio for financially distressed
companies); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Intellectual Property Financing: Security Interests in Do-
main Names and Web Contents, 8 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REv. 489, 489 (2002) ("[Mlany
companies use intellectual property for security purposes in commercial financing schemes.").
58. See Mann, supra note 27, at 995 n. 172.
59. Id. at 992; see generally Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codi-
fication, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008); Long, supra note 19.
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companies. 0 Still another possibility is that patents, even if not valuable
to the startup, might be extremely valuable in the hands of a third party,
such as an incumbent acquirer. If this is so, the patent may offer residual
value to investors, even if the startup fails to execute its business model.
If a startup's patents can be used effectively by others to sell products,
demand royalties, or file infringement suits, they may have value quite
independent from their utility to the startup per se. So, even if a startup's
patents may offer little to the company in terms of its strategy for earn-
ing profits, they may nevertheless be valuable assets on the balance
sheet, particularly in the eyes of investors and lenders.62
E. "The Best Defense is a Good Offense ": Patents as Shields
It is a clich6 of war, boxing, and football strategists that "the best de-
fense is a good offense."3 In the experience of one of the authors as a
practicing IP litigator, this clich6 is also well-worn in the patent arena.
An alleged infringer that can assert one of its own patents against a
plaintiff as a counterclaim can benefit in several ways. First, the plaintiff
will usually become exposed to the threat of an injunction on the sale of
its potentially infringing products.65 If the revenue associated with the
plaintiff's potentially infringing products is comparable to the revenue
associated with the defendant's, the shrinking of the possible transfer
payment may drive the case to a quick settlement, even if the defendant
60. Such an explanation raises the question of why the entrepreneur would not recog-
nize the inherent value in the asset, or why the investor would demand that the entrepreneur
make such an investment in patents when the entrepreneur, who is arguably in the best posi-
tion to recognize where investments would yield their highest returns, believes that patents are
not that best use. An answer to this puzzle could lie in a principal-agent problem in which the
entrepreneur engages in investments to maximize both her pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains,
while the investor is only interested in the former. See generally PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH
LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2004) (discussing how venture capital investors face
a principal-agent problem in funding startups).
61. See Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation, supra note 57, at 786.
62. Cf Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intel-
lectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552 (finding that a firm's motive for filing patents "to enhance
the reputation of the firm or its employees," which the authors interpreted as useful for secur-
ing financing and joint ventures, was significantly negatively correlated with firm size).
63. See, e.g., Anthony H. Cordesman, The Best Defense Is a Good Offense, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 2004, at Al7.
64. See, e.g., Rand Bateman, The Best Defense Is a Good Offense-Even in Patents, IP
THOUGHTS (Jan. 29, 2008, 9:38 AM), http://ipthoughts.com/2008/01/29/the-best-defense-is-a-
good-offense--even-in-patents.aspx.
65. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.04 (2008).
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asserts a weak patent.' Second, the counterclaim will usually level the
playing field for the accused infringer. For example, legal contentions
that the plaintiff might make to strengthen its claim of infringement (for
example, on the proper standard of obviousness) will usually redound to
the benefit of the accused infringer as well. Additionally, the accused
infringer that asserts its own patents will typically be able to use any of
the plaintiff's defenses in its own defensive case. Third, counterclaiming
increases the plaintiff's costs. Altogether, using a "defensive" strategy of
asserting an infringement counterclaim can substantially decrease the
defendant's risks and costs of litigation, providing it greater leverage in
bargaining towards a settlement. Because of these benefits, startups may
seek patents to erect a "defensive shield."
While small firms face resource constraints in acquiring patents,
they may be disproportionately benefited from beginning to build a de-
fensive patent stance. From one perspective, small firms have even more
of an incentive than large firms to acquire patents to prevent litigation.
Because large firms are often repeat players, they are more often en-
gaged in cross-licensing of patents and other market activities-such as
participation on standards-setting committees-that offer advantages in
settling disputes in the absence of litigation.6 Smaller firms, especially
startups, are by and large industry outsiders without these means of co-
ordination. Indeed, there is empirical evidence showing that the size of
a small firm's patent portfolio is a significant determinant of its ability to
*69avoid litigation .
F. Patent Bullying
Even for large firms holding stockpiles of patents, competitors
sometimes engage in prolonged patent "wars." One example is the re-
cently settled worldwide litigation between the two wireless companies,
Broadcom and Qualcomm." If competitors assert strong patents that are
66. See Jean Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights:
A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 49/50 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 223
(1998).
67. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 51, at 47-48; Timothy Simcoe, Stuart
Graham & Maryann Feldman, Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Prop-
erty and Platform Technologies, 18 J. ECON. MANAGERIAL STRATEGY 775 (2009) (finding that
in the standard-setting context, small firms tend to litigate more over essential intellectual
property than their larger counterparts).
68. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, supra note 51, at 57.
69. See id. at 47-48, 57-58.
70. FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS 69-88 (1994) (documenting the hard-
fought patent litigation between Polaroid and Kodak over instant photography).
71. See Jonathan Sidener, Qualcomm Says Competitors Conspiring in Patent Dispute,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 21, 2008, at Cl. Qualcomm and Broadcom recently settled
most of this litigation. See Brooke Crothers, Qualcomm, Broadcom Reach $891 Million
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likely to stand up at trial, and the parties are battling to maintain supra-
competitive prices, presumably the patent system effectively fulfils its
aim of providing appropriate ex post incentives to encourage ex ante in-
vention. However, when the patents are weak, in the sense that the
patentee is unlikely to prevail, the patent system may not function opti-
mally because of the uncertainty and high costs involved in patent
litigation.72
Thus, it may be that incumbents can strategically exploit weak pat-
ents to prevent competition from potential entrants. The story of Vonage
is illustrative. Vonage, founded in 2000,73 was one of the first of a new
wave of telecom startups to provide voice services over the Internet
through traditional telephone handsets. 74 After wide-scale initial market-
ing, Vonage secured two million subscriber lines by 2006, many of
which had been switched from the incumbent telecom carriers, including
Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint.75 These incumbents responded by asserting
patent infringement claims against Vonage. Despite a belief among in-
dustry observers that the carriers' patents were invalid or not infringed,
Vonage ultimately settled the cases for roughly $200 million,7 ' about a
quarter of its annual revenues.79 Since settling the lawsuits, Vonage's
marketing expenditures have lessened and its subscriber growth has
slowed, causing in part a nearly 90% decline in the company's value.80
Settlement, NANOTECH: THE CIRCUITS BLOG CNET NEWS (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:18 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13924_3-10227815-64.html.
72. In certain foreign jurisdictions, like the United Kingdom, fee-shifting and other
procedural rules may constrain litigation costs, making the effect of weak patents much less
severe. See Morag Macdonald, IP IT and Telecoms: Beware of the Troll, LAWYER, Sept. 26,
2005, at 26, available at 2005 WLNR 15209913 (describing common litigation policies that
lessen the sting of weak patents in Europe, such as fee-shifting and bars to contingent-fee
arrangements).
73. See Profile for Vonage Holdings, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q/pr?s=VG (last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
74. See Lev Grossman, On the Internet, Talk Is Cheap, TIME, Apr. 15, 2002, at 77.
75. See Chris Williams, Vonage: Patent Smackdown Won't Bring Shutters Down,
REGISTER (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/02/26/vonage-defends_
against-verizon. One of the authors performed legal work for Vonage in the AT&T case. All of
the information provided on Vonage herein is publicly available.
76. See id.
77. See Mike Masnick, AT&T Joins the Party of Jealous Telcos: Sues Vonage for Patent
Infringement, TECHDIRT (Oct. 22, 2007, 1:03 AM), http://techdirt.com/articles/20071019/
184443.shtml.
78. See Nathan Eddy, Vonage, AT&T Agree on Patent Lawsuit Settlement, CRN.com
Dec. 26, 2007, http://www.cm.com/networking/205203144.
79. See, Income Statement for Vonage Holdings Corporation, YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/is?s=VG&annual (last visited Apr. 15, 2008) (Dec. 31, 2007 data).
80. See David Shabelman, Some Hope for Vonage, THEDEAL.COM, (Nov. 9, 2007),
available at Lexis-Nexis, News-All file; see also Seth Wallis-Jones, Growth Slows but Vonage
Trims Losses on Path to Profits, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Feb. 14, 2008; Vonage Holdings Corp.,
YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/q?s=VG (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
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Although there are other reasons for Vonage's decline, the sapping of
significant revenues early in its technology and product trajectory
drained resources from its research, development, and marketing-each
of which is important for long-term success.
G. "Blocking" and "Preemptive" Patenting
A company seeking to avoid a situation like that faced by Vonage
may seek patents to preempt competitors from gaining patent protection
over the company's own inventions. 2 Since invention in and of itself
does not count as prior art if it is "abandoned, suppressed, or con-
cealed," another later-patenting inventor is permitted under law to
prevent the earlier inventor from using the invention (by claiming in-
fringement against the earlier inventor who maintained the invention as a
secret).m While open publication of an invention provides a means of
preempting later patenting by others, this option tends to undercut the
inventor's option value in the invention and thus is not commonly used.
Inventors also may seek so-called "blocking" patents that have the
unique feature of preventing a competitor company from realizing the
full value of its own patents.6 This strategy is built upon the reality
that patents do not provide an affirmative right to "use, sell, and
81. See Paul H. Jensen, Elizabeth M. Webster & Hielke Buddelmeyer, Innovation,
Technological Conditions and New Firm Survival, 84 EcON. REc. 434 (2008); Andrew Beck-
erman-Rodau, The Supreme Court Engages in Judicial Activism in Interpreting the Patent Law
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 10 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 165, 172 (2007).
82. See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 137, 144 (2000) (describing such a strategy); Joachim Henkel &
Florian Jell, Alternative Motives to File for Patents: Profiting from Pendency and Publication
(Apr. 8, 2009)(working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271242; see also
Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000); Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to
Professor Parchomovsky. 98 Mici. L. REv. 2358 (2000).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (2000).
84. Note that there is a narrow exception in certain situations of "prior use" involving
business methods. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2000) (limiting the "prior use" exemption to
business methods reduced to practice at least one year before the effective filing date of the
patent and commercially used before the effective filing date of the patent).
85. See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
183, 194-96 (2004). Additionally, patents sometimes enjoy benefits as "prior art" not available
to publications, because patent examiners tend to search patent databases more extensively
than publication databases. See Bhaven Sampat, Examining Patent Examination: An Analysis
of Examiner and Applicant Generated Prior Art 9-11, available at http://www.stiy.coml
Measuringinnovation/Sampat.pdf (finding that examiners' prior art citations overwhelmingly
arise from issued patents, with only 12% from non-patent prior art).
86. STEPHEN C. GLAZIER, PATENT STRATEGIES FOR BUSINEss 34 (2008) (describing
this "picket fence" strategy).
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manufacture."87 Instead, patents are "negative" rights that endow their
owners with a right to exclude infringers from "using, selling, and manu-
facturing.""8 In this way, Company X may file for patents on
improvements to Company Y's patented products, even if those im-
provements technically fall within the scope of Company Y's patents. 9 In
that circumstance, Company Y's and Company X's patents will "block"
one another, thus preventing each company from using, making, and
selling the improvements." Because this strategy requires technical and
legal sophistication, small entrepreneurial startups may use it less com-
monly than larger companies. Nevertheless, where patenting is more
common, such as in the biotechnology and semiconductor sectors, ex-
perienced board members or attorneys may counsel startup executives to
follow a "blocking" patent strategy.9'
H. Patents as Foils
Because both technology and market environments can be fraught
with uncertainty, companies may pursue patenting strategies to confuse,
or even mislead, competitors, market analysts, or journalists that might
be reading patents and applications to predict the emergence of new
products or services. For example, the publication of Apple Inc.'s appli-
cations and patents are routinely reported upon by media outlets intent to
predict the arrival of new products.92 Companies can use the equivalent
of an information strategy to mislead competitors as to the technological
direction the company is taking, and its planned forthcoming products
and services, by planting a false and misleading trail of patent disclo-
sures. One study of patenting by large companies completed in the 1990s
87. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000); see Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude:
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000,88 CALIF. L. REv. 2187, 2222 (2000).
88. See 35 U.S.C. § 271; see also Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices
and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 159, 167-71 (1942); Katherine J. Strand-
burg et al., Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the "Patent
Explosion," 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293, 1323 (2006) ("[T]he legal effect of a patent is to
provide the patentee a right to exclude others . . . ").
89. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLuM. L. REv. 839, 860-62 (1990) (describing blocking patents).
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Rajiv P. Patel, Fenwick & West L.L.P., A Patent Portfolio Development
Strategy for Start-Up Companies (Nov. 1, 2002), http://www.fenwick.com/docstore/
Publications/IP/IP_Articles/PatentPortfolio -Dev.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Alex Brooks, Apple Awarded Multi-Touch Patent, WORLD OF APPLE (Jan.
26, 2009), http://news.worldofapple.com/archives/2009/01/26/apple-awarded-multi-touch-
patent/; Tim Stevens, Apple Patent Application Reveals New Display Housing, Mythical Tablet
Nowhere to be Found, ENGADGET (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.engadget.com/2009/02/03/apple-
patent-application-reveals-new-display-housing-mythical-t/.
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showed that this strategy was not uncommon.9 Because startups are
more financially constrained than their larger counterparts, however, it
stands to reason that pursuit of such a strategy-which would require
intensive patenting-would be less common.
I. Patents as Substitutes for Nondisclosure Agreements
While it may seem antithetical to the disclosure role of patenting,
another purpose of seeking patents is to maintain secrecy before the pat-
ent is published. Because a patent can often prevent copying by third
parties, a patent may effectively serve as a non-negotiable form of non-
disclosure agreement (NDA), usually protected by broad injunctive
relief. NDAs are agreement used by employers to restrict the disclosure
or use of confidential information by employees or third parties.94 It is
not uncommon for technology companies to require new hires, espe-
cially technical employees like engineers, to sign as part of the
employment agreement a nondisclosure provision that prevents the hire
from disclosing or using knowledge gained during employment not in
the public domain. 5 Companies collaborating in a research joint venture
also commonly use NDAs to prevent the employees of the partner firm
from disclosing learned information and know-how. Moreover, inven-
tors often seek NDAs from third parties during licensing,
*97commercialization, or investment negotiations.
While NDAs are useful, patents may offer a stronger "fix" to the
problem of employee information disclosure. First, although NDAs can
provide for injunctive relief, the protections are generally limited to pre-
venting information disclosure and often do not extend-unlike
patenting-to the manufacture and sale of a product incorporating the
information."' Second, proving that there has been a breach of the NDA
contract is often difficult.99 Third, commercial partners may refuse to
93. See British Technology Group, IPR Market Benchmark Study (1999) (prepared by
Business Planning & Research International) (on file with author) [hereinafter BTG Study]
(finding that about 20% of the respondents engaged in such a strategy).
94. See Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropria-
tion, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 507 (2006).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 44 cmt. d (1995)
("When the trade secret is narrow in scope and closely related to publicly available informa-
tion, the injunction should be carefully restricted to the contours of the trade secret in order to
avoid encroachment on the public domain."); Robert Merges, A Transactional View of Prop-
erty Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1498 (2005) [hereinafter Merges, A Transactional
View].
99. See, e.g., M. Scott McDonald, Symposium, Noncompete Contracts: Understanding
the Cost of Unpredictability, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 137, 149-50 (2003); cf Greenberg v.
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sign the NDA contract." A patent offers a solution to these downsides of
contract since it (i) binds the world, not just the parties to an agreement;
(ii) prevents the use, sale, or manufacture of any product embodying the
confidential information; (iii) treats as irrelevant the question of whether
the information was stolen; and (iv) typically provides the strong coer-
cion of injunctive remedies.' Because patents are advantaged in these
ways, and because entrepreneurs may lack negotiating power relative to
larger firms, startups may have more incentives to use patents in this
manner, especially in their relationships with larger companies. How-
ever, once again, financial and resource constraints may make pursuing
strategic patenting of this type difficult. 0 2
J. "Image is Everything" Patenting
Human psychology and behavior offer a final reason for seeking
patents. Inventors may file for patents to validate the value and impor-
tance of their ideas: the Patent Office, with its expert technical
examiners, may offer credibility by certifying that the idea met the gov-
ernment's utility, novelty, and nonobviousness standards. According to a
popular book for independent inventors, Patent It Yourself, "[s]ome in-
ventors file for and obtain patents mainly for vanity, or the prestige a
patent brings."103
Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("Plaintiffs in trade secret cases
... are confronted with an extraordinarily difficult task. Misappropriation and misuse can
rarely be proved by convincing direct evidence.... Against this often delicate construct of
circumstantial evidence there frequently must be balanced defendants and defendants' wit-
nesses who directly deny everything.").
100. See, e.g., Merges, A Transactional View, supra note 98, at 1498.
101. Although a patent's rights do not inhere prior to publication, if a third party uses the
pre-publication information in making, selling, or offering to sell a product, it is likely to con-
tinue that use beyond the date of publication, which can provide a basis for an infringement
claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(d)(1) (2000). So, in effect, a patent can substitute for a pre-
publication NDA.
102. Indeed, there is a strong argument that the boundaries created by patents play a
large part in enabling the existence of small firms by fostering the presence of inter-firm
boundaries. See Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights
and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 470-71 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1649 (2009); Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 575, 613
(2007) ("[Rlobust provision of intellectual property rights can encourage interfirm transac-
tions.").
103. DAVID PRESSMAN, PATENT IT YOURSELF 8 (2006). Interestingly, in a recent study
examining the relationship between the patenting activity of engineers and those aspects of
their jobs most important to them, "intellectual challenge" was much more strongly correlated
to patenting rates than other factors, most notably economic rewards. Henry Sauermann &
Wesley M. Cohen, Duke Univ., Fuqua Sch. of Bus., "I Don't Work for Money": The Motives
of Scientists and Engineers, Address at the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology March
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Whatever view engineers and scientists may have of the past quality
of patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office," among the general public, a
patent can lend importance to an invention. Companies routinely place
"patent pending" tags in their product advertisements (strangely, even if
the patent has been granted).'o While the usefulness of applying the
''patent pending" moniker in marketing has apparently escaped rigorous
empirical study, at least one commentator has suggested the words have
value,'0 and many examples of their use exist."7
Apart from direct marketing image, patenting may provide startups
with another even-more important type of image: a signal to investors
and analysts of the quality of the technical capabilities of the firm. Eco-
nomic research by Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg
has shown that patents, and particularly highly cited patents, are posi-
tively related to the market value of large publicly-traded companies,
even after taking account of other factors such as tangible assets and
R&D spending.o' Moreover, other scholars have hypothesized that pat-
enting acts as a signal of quality to investors among small technology
companies." While neither of these studies determinatively shows that
signaling plays a role in patenting, the findings are suggestive of a role
for technology image. Accordingly, it may be that this sort of recognition
2008 Entrepreneurship Symposium 8 (Mar. 7, 2008), http://www.law.berkeley.edufiles/
sauermann.pdf.
104. See Michael Orey, The Patent Epidemic: It's Wasting Companies' Money and Slow-
ing the Development of New Products, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Jan. 9, 2006), http://
www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_02/b3966086.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2010)
(suggesting that "[o]ver the past two decades, critics say, the hurdle for passing the obvious-
ness test has been steadily lowered, and the U.S. is now awash in a sea of junk patents.").
105. It is possible that the "patent pending" signal provides benefits beyond mere reputa-
tion or vanity - to the extent that such a signal fosters fear, uncertainty, and doubt over what
monopoly rights may erupt in the technology space, competitors may be less inclined to invest
in innovating in the area. Peter Menell suggested to one of the authors that perhaps the "pat-
ent-pending" phrase is more effective than a mere "patented" tagline, because the former
portrays a product so "cutting edge" that not even enough time has passed for the patent to
issue.
106. See, e.g., ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SE-
CRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS 216 (1995) ("[T]he words patent pending
may have substantial psychological or marketing value.").
107. See, e.g., Bosch Sec. Sys., Inc., Constant Light Technology (Patent Pending) for
LED Infrared Security Lighting, I (Aug. 2010), http://www.boschsecurity.us/NR/rdonlyres/
388611 OE-9392-4B8D-B40B-00B99004D5EO/9428/ConstantLightWhitePaper.pdf; Learn
How to Get the Patent Pending InstantBuzz Now, http://www.squidoo.com/LeviHolman
(last visited Sept. 10, 2010); Scorpion EXO-400 Sting Full Face Street Motorcycle Helmets,
http://www.extremesupply.com/scorpionhelmets/scorpionexo400sting.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2010).
108. Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent
Citations, 36 RAND J. ECON. 16, 31-32 (2005).
109. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 54, at 1-2.
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is a non-trivial driver of patenting for startup companies looking to im-
prove the image of their products or capabilities.
K. Reasons for Not Patenting
During the last three decades, the number of patent applications filed
at the U.S. Patent Office has grown substantially. "o While scholarly re-
search has pointed to varied reasons for this growth,"' the associated
change in the amount of technological innovation over the same pe-
riod-both patented and unpatented-is even more speculative.
Unfortunately, we cannot know with certainty the quantity or value of
unpatented inventions. We can, however, analyze the reasons that may
lead inventors, and startup companies, to forgo patent protection on their
inventions that are valuable or otherwise objectively patentable.
1. Technology is Perceived as Unpatentable
Some inventors may regard their inventions as unpatentable, because
they believe the inventions are either outside the scope of the patent
law's subject matter allowance or otherwise obvious in view of the prior
art.' 2 However, since the scope of patentable subject matter has been
quite broad, it is likely that some inventors have been wrong in their be-
liefs, mistakenly choosing to forgo a patent application."' Examples of
subject matter that some novices may have mistakenly believed to be
unpatentable, but for which patents have issued, include many business
methods, such as schemes to avoid paying taxes,"14 and so-called "mental
steps" patents, such as a physician's determination of whether an amount
110. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BU-
REAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 63 (2008).
11. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 50, at 2-4 (demonstrating that a significant change oc-
curred in the rate of patenting shortly after the creation of the Federal Circuit); Samuel
Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revolution: What is Behind the
Recent Surge in Patenting? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6204, 1997),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6204 (suggesting that the rise in patenting during
the 1990s was primarily due to increased innovation, and not the pro-patent regime created by
legal changes).
112. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Bush, Advising Clients: How to Recognize and Protect Intel-
lectual Property, 62 ALA. LAW. 380, 380 (2001) (claiming that from large companies down to
individual inventors, potential clients often do not understand what is protectable as intellec-
tual property).
113. A related reason for inventors not filing is that they think their inventions should not
be patentable on policy grounds. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra
note 16, at 1314. While these inventors think their inventions would be patentable, they do not
file because they believe their inventions should not be patentable. See id.
114. See generally William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress
Respond to this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REv. 229 (2007).
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of a naturally occurring chemical in the body indicates illness.' Al-
though the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Bilski v. Kappos"' casts
doubt on the continuing viability of "pure" business method patents-
that is, those that are wholly abstract in nature" -the scope of
patentable subject matter remains fairly expansive."
While those inexperienced in prosecuting patents may see the previ-
ous patenting of discrete ideas as a bar to patenting, the more
experienced inventors (and their attorneys) realize that discrete inven-
tions may be recombined to create patentable disclosures. Ideas that are
seemingly obvious, even to lay observers, have passed muster in the
Patent Office." 9 Amazon.com's "one-click" patent is a favorite example:
it claims in essential part "a single-action ordering component ... in re-
sponse to performance of only a single action."2 So, while novelty and
nonobviousness are certainly bars to patenting, the inexperienced may
not hold accurate perceptions of their effects. Thus, the least experi-
enced-e.g., first-time inventors and entrepreneurs-may be more likely
to underestimate the broad scope of patentability and, as a result,
wrongly fail to file a patent.
2. The High Costs of Patenting and Patent Litigation
The law of demand indicates that as prices rise, we will see less de-
mand, suggesting that higher "prices" for patenting (the fees charged by
the USPTO and attorneys) will deter inventors from "demanding" these
115. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127-35
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer stated that the Court's dismissal
of the case was improvidently granted and reasoned that the claim-at-issue merely "instructs
the user to (1) obtain test results and (2) think about them." Id. at 136.
116. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
i17. See id. at 3229-3231.
118. See Ted Sichelman, Guest Post on Bilski: Why Bilski Benefits Startup Companies,
PATENTLY-O (June 29, 2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/guest-post-
why-bilski -benefits-startup-companies.htm.
119. See, e.g., FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8-19 (2003) (citing patent and economic scholars that criticize
the lenient nature of the nonobviousness requirement), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DIs-
CONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 25-26 (2004); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.,
2004); Robert P. Merges, Symposium, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
577, 598 (1999) (noting that standards at the USPTO would be raised if the requirements were
tightened).
120. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 col.10 1.51 (filed Sept. 12. 1997); see generally Stephen
Dirksen et al., Who's Afraid of Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com?, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 3 (2001).
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services (thus bringing fewer patent applications into the process).12 Op-
portunity costs tend to exacerbate these direct pecuniary costs: company
executives and engineers must spend time in the prosecution of patents
instead of attending to their key managerial, design, and innovative func-
tions.12 2 Moreover, the value of a company's patent may be negligible
unless it can credibly threaten patent enforcement actions. 12 It may be-
if cash constraints are the major driver-that competitors are more likely
to infringe the patents of resource-poor startups, on the theory that these
companies are less able to enforce their rights.124 To the extent that entre-
preneurs are more likely to face cash constraints, it stands to reason that,
even if the startup files an infringement suit, the case may be settled for
less at the margin: without the credible threat of maintaining a patent suit
121
which, on average, can cost each party over $5 million2, settlement
amounts can be expected to decline. Accordingly, to the extent that en-
trepreneurs are resource constrained, and patent enforcement is
contingent on expending resources (both financial and managerial),
startups likely face lower incentives to apply for patents on their inven-
-126tions.
3. Perceptions that Patents Provide Weak Protection:
"Design Arounds"
It has been said that patents can be a "gigantic waste of time and
money."l27 Some innovators-particularly in some technology fields-
believe that patents can be easily "designed around," a notion that can
lead companies to regard patenting as a worthless activity.128 This view
maintains that if the claims of the patent are sufficiently narrow, a third
121. See Christensen, supra note 53, at 10.
122. See, e.g., Mann, supra note 27, at 982-83.
123. This credible threat includes the ability to detect infringement in the first instance,
which may be very costly itself, especially for patents on internal processes that are not dis-
cernable from commercial products. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human
Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721, 739 (1990).
124. Conversely, it may be that a small firm faces larger incentives to enforce its patents,
since the company's value may be proportionately more bound to their upstream technological
"crown jewels" as compared to their larger counterparts operating in the downstream product
markets. See Simcoe et al, supra note 67, at 20.
125. See ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 35, at 32.
126. As we noted earlier, some entrepreneurs may compensate for inadequate resources
by using contingent-fee attorneys. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. But contin-
gency arrangements are unlikely to be available in all situations in which a third party
infringes a valid and enforceable patent.
127. Bruce Byfield, End Software Patents Project Comes Out Swinging, LINUX.COM
(Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.linux.com/feature/1281 10 (quoting Brad Feld, founder and chair
of Mobius Venture Capital).
128. For instance, one software startup company CFO asserts that "[tlhere are a lot of
ways to work around [software] patents." Mann, supra note 27, at 978 n.95.
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party can escape infringement by making simple changes to the underly-
ing invention while achieving the same functionality.
There is some evidence to suggest, however, that it can be difficult to
design around patents, regardless of the underlying technology. First,
although the disclosure in a patent must provide a written description
sufficient to enable the claims that are drafted,I29 in recent years the Fed-
eral Circuit has applied the enablement and written description doctrines
fairly loosely, particularly outside the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
fields.3 o This trend has allowed patentees to broadly claim their inven-
tions, often outside the embodiments disclosed in the patent
specification. Second, some courts have construed claims more broadly
than their language indicates."' Finally, there is no requirement per se
that claims be literally infringed-the doctrine of equivalents provides
that if the product in question is "insubstantially different" from that
claimed or performs "substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to achieve substantially the same result" as that claimed, there
is nevertheless an infringement.'32 Although the doctrine of equivalents
has been reduced in stature in recent years, the incidence of patentee
wins under such a theory is not negligible.' Given these realities, it may
be wise to view any suggestion that patents can be easily avoided with
skepticism. Nonetheless, again, an uninformed startup-especially one
lacking knowledgeable counsel-may choose to forgo filing an applica-
tion based on a mistaken view that its claims would be too narrow to
provide substantial benefits in the face of aggressive and deep-pocketed
competitors.
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
130. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 110, at 65-67; Julie E. Cohen & Mark A.
Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALF. L. REv. 1, 24 (2001).
The Federal Circuit implemented a relatively heightened disclosure requirement for biotech-
nology products in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963 (Fed. Cir.
2001), but arguably has not applied it consistently. See Ajeet P. Pai, Note, The Low Written
Description Bar for Software Inventions, 94 VA. L. REv. 457, 471-78 (2008).
131. See generally Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent Prosecution,
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 179, 210-12 (2007).
132. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002)
("Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and
its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying."); see also Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) ("'To temper unsparing logic and
prevent an infringer from stealing the benefit of the invention' a patentee may invoke this
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.' ") (quoting Royal Typewriter
Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1948) and Sanitary Refrigerator Co.
v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
133. Inst. for Intellectual Prop. & Info. Law, Univ. of Houston Law Ctr., U.S. Patent
Litigation Statistics Project, PATSTATS.ORG., http://www.patstats.org [hereinafter PatStats]
(last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (showing seventy patentee wins on the doctrine of equivalents in
district courts from 2000 to 2007).
135Fall 2010]
136 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 17:111
4. Fear of Disclosing Valuable Trade Secrets
The "patent and secret as substitutes" view suggests that an inventor
must either keep his invention as a trade secret or disclose it, either dur-
ing the application process or, at the latest, when the patent issues.134
Obviously, if an invention can be easily copied or reverse engineered,
and is accessible to competitors, 3 5 then a patentee cannot expect to ap-
propriate much value from trade secret protection.' However, if the
patentee can keep the invention secret, and unobserved, it may be valu-
able to forgo patenting in order to avoid disclosure. Moreover, despite
the seemingly binary choice between trade secrecy and patenting, in
practice a patentee is often able to patent an invention while keeping its
"secret sauce" as a trade secret.' 7 In part because patent law disclosure
requirements tend to be weak, the stark contrast that some scholars pre-
sent between these two options-the so-called secret-patent divide-is
generally much fuzzier in practice.""
5. Other Forms of Protection
The last major reason why startup companies may not patent is that
they may believe other forms of legal or non-legal protection are ade-
quate, or even superior, given their business strategies. It may be that a
patenting strategy is merely redundant given other forms of legal protec-
tion over innovations, including copyright, trademark, or contractual
134. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 24, at 294-95; Dan L. Burk, Misappropriation
of Trade Secrets in Biotechnology Licensing, 4 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 121, 130 (1994) ("For
those inventions that are patentable subject matter, concurrent patent protection and trade
secret protection are incompatible because the disclosure required by the patent destroys trade
secrecy."); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1974) (implicitly
assuming that an inventor must make a choice between trade secrecy and disclosure by patent-
ing).
135. An internal manufacturing process, for instance, might be easy to copy, but may not
have to see the light of day, and thus be protected from prying eyes.
136. Importantly, trade secret protection does not prevent a third party from copying or
reverse engineering a product that it has legally obtained. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-3
(1985).
137. For instance, both patents and trade secrets were used by Pilkington Glass to protect
codified and tacit elements of the firm's "float glass" invention, a radical improvement in
creating smooth glass. See United States v. Pilkington, PLC, No. CV 94-345, 1994 WL
750645 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 1994). Moreover, applicants may enjoy trade secrecy while a patent
application is pending, providing the applicant both priority advantages and the protection of
trade secrecy before publication. See Stuart J.H. Graham & Deepak Somaya, Vermeers and
Rembrandts in the Same Attic: Complementarity Between Copyright and Trademark Leverag-
ing Strategies in Software (Ga. Inst. of Tech. TI:GER Working Paper, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstractid=887484.
138. See Graham & Somaya, supra note 137.
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protections.' Accordingly, patents may coexist (and not overlap) with
these other legal forms of protection, providing at best supplementary
rights which do not offer sufficiently improved protection.'40
Patenting may also fail to serve as a sufficient complement to
non-legal strategic advantages. A company may enjoy "first-mover" ad-
vantages or possess complementary assets, such as production or
marketing capabilities, that effectively prevent competition in the market
for commercial embodiments of the invention.141 If these non-legal ad-
vantages are strong enough, or if product life cycles are short enough,
patenting may be unnecessary or effectively redundant.
II. THE (PAUCITY OF) PRE-EXISTING DATA ON
PATENTING BY ENTREPRENEURS
Despite the substantial theoretical literature on why entities decide to
patent or not, there is relatively meager empirical evidence about patent-
ing by startup companies, particularly in the United States. This Part
begins by briefly reviewing several studies conducted in the 1970s, 80s,
and 90s in the United States and Europe of large, mainly publicly traded
companies. Then, it explores the handful of empirical studies, some
based primarily on anecdote, of patenting by entrepreneurs. Finally, it
summarizes the important results of these studies.142
A. Surveying Large Company Patenting
One line of studies has surveyed large, mostly publicly traded com-
panies. 14 Although large, established companies clearly differ in many
139. See, e.g., Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1279-96
(discussing that patenting ranks behind copyright and trademark among software entrepre-
neurs for securing competitive advantage from their technology innovations).
140. See Graham & Somaya, supra note 137.
141. See Teece, supra note 51. First-mover advantages are particularly relevant in fast-
moving industries, such as software and the Internet. See Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold
Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 199, 212
(2000) (suggesting that the short business cycle for Internet technologies lends import even to
short-lived first-mover advantages).
142. A portion of this Part is adapted from Graham & Sichelman, supra note 21, at
1088-90.
143. See, e.g., C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE (1973); Richard C. Levin, Alvin K.
Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987); Edwin
Mansfield, Mark Schwartz, & Samuel Wagner, Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical
Study, 91 EcON. J. 907 (1981); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study,
32 MGMT. SCI. 173 (1986) [hereinafter, Mansfield, Patents and Innovation]; Cohen et al.,
supra note 62.
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regards from new companies, these studies are instructive not only be-
cause they provide initial insights into the reasons why startups do and
do not patent, but also because their findings inform the majority of
scholars' views on the topic. In a series of studies in the 1970s and early
1980s, Edwin Mansfield and others reported a statistically significant
correlation between firm size and the percentage of inventions that were
patented, inferring that out-of-pocket costs are more substantial disin-
centives to relatively smaller firms.'" However, in this early period, they
reported that firms of all sizes found patenting of relatively limited im-
portance to the profit potential of their innovations, although their
studies did not include startups, and they noted that if "very small firms"
were included, "the results might be different." 45 In a late-1980s study
by researchers at Yale University of 650 publicly traded companies, re-
spondents reported that preventing product duplication was a
substantially more important reason to file patents than securing royalty
income.14 6 Additionally, the Yale study found that the major factor limit-
ing the effectiveness of product patents was the ability of competitors to
invent around claims, followed (in descending order of importance) by
the lack of patentability of inventions, the difficulty of enforcing a pat-
ent, the disclosure of too much information, the likelihood of
invalidation of the patent if challenged, the rapid rate of technological
change, the existence of cross-licensing agreements with potential in-
fringers, and the possibility of compulsory licensing of the patent.147
An important study organized at Carnegie Mellon University by Wes
Cohen, Richard Nelson, and John Walsh in the mid-1990s found that for
generally large U.S. companies, the main driver of patenting was pre-
venting imitation, followed by preempting competitors, preventing
lawsuits, improving negotiating leverage, enhancing reputation, securing
licensing income, and tracking internal performance.14 Smaller firms
were more likely to report patenting to enhance reputation than larger
firms.149 Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh also examined reasons not to patent,
determining that the ease of inventing around a potential patent was the
primary rationale for forgoing patenting, followed (in descending order
of importance) by a belief that the invention was not novel, a reluctance
to disclose the information, the cost of applying for the patent, and the
144. Mansfield, Patents and Innovation, supra note 143, at 177.
145. Id. at 175.
146. Levin et al., supra note 143, at 794 tbl.1.
147. See id. at tbl.6. The compulsory licensing requirement-specifically, when the
patent is not commercialized within a fixed period of time, usually three years after issu-
ance-is applicable only in certain foreign countries. See PATENTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
§§ 1:19-20 (2008).
148. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 47 fig.7, 48 fig.8.
149. Id. at 18, 24.
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cost of enforcing the patents" In addition, they found that smaller firms
were more likely to forgo patenting than larger firms because of the costs
of filing and enforcement."'
A survey of large European companies in the early 1990s also found
that preventing imitation was the most important reason for patenting,
followed (in descending order of importance) by improving bargaining
leverage in negotiations, preempting patenting by others, securing licens-
ing revenues, protecting international market expansion, and signaling
internal employee performance. 5 2 Another study of primarily large Ger-
man firms found that the largest ones were more apt to engage in
strategic patenting-that is, patenting for reasons other than preventing
copying or maintaining supernormal profits-than smaller firms.
Smaller firms, on the other hand, were more likely than larger ones to
use patents for reputational purposes, such as improving their company
and technological image.15 4
Despite their valuable findings, these studies failed to investigate and
explain why startups patent.'5 S Moreover, significant shifts have occurred
in industry and innovation dynamics since these surveys were com-
pleted, including the rise of the software and biotechnology industries,
which have grown on the heels of important legal decisions in the early
1980s."' Finally, there have been major changes in the patent law
150. Id. at 14-15 & fig.5.
151. See id. at 15-16.
152. A. ARUNDEL ET AL., PACE REPORT: INNOVATION STRATEGIES OF EUROPE'S LARG-
EST INDUSTRIAL FIRMS: RESULTS OF THE PACE SURVEY FOR INFORMATION SOURCES, PUBLIC
RESEARCH, PROTECTION OF INNOVATIONS, AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 13 (1995) (on
file with authors).
153. Knut Blind et al., Motives to Patent: Empirical Evidence from Germany, 35 RES.
PoL'Y 655, 660 (2006).
154. Id. at 664-65.
155. The Mansfield study focused on "firms with about $25 million or more in sales, not
very small ones." Mansfield, Patents and Innovation, supra note 143, at 174. The Yale study
used a ranking of companies with R&D expenses greater than 1% of sales or $35 million in
1981. Levin et al., supra note 143, at 819. Similarly, the Carnegie Mellon study surveyed
eligible labs in the Directory of American Research and Technology as well as other publicly
traded firms, oversampling Fortune 500 companies. Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 4. Addi-
tionally, the published results of the Cohen study were limited to firms "with at least
$5,000,000 in sales or business units of at least 20 people." Id. at 5. The Blind study included
a "high share of very large, actively patenting companies." Blind et al., supra note 153, at 660.
156. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (holding that the execution of a
process, controlled by running a computer program, is patentable); Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that genetically modified microorganisms are patentable). The
software industry is especially different today from the early 1980s or 1990s. See, e.g., Stuart
J.H. Graham & David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in the U.S. Software Indus-
try, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 219-227 (Wesley Cohen & Steven
Merrill eds., 2003).
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landscape, including the emergence of so-called "patent trolls,"'07 shift-
ing case law from the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court,15 and a
significant upward trend in overall patenting and in the hazards of litiga-
tion.'59 In sum, although these surveys may provide instructive
background on what the patenting behavior of new, embryonic firms
looks (or looked) like, they are certainly far from conclusive.
B. Few Targeted Studies on Entrepreneurial Patenting
1. Some Scattered Anecdotes
Perhaps the most prevalent form of data on entrepreneurial patenting
to date has come from anecdotes available in scattered magazines, news-
papers, blogs, congressional hearing reports, and-less commonly-law
reviews. In an influential article, Ronald Mann summarizes a series of
sixty interviews with firm managers, venture capitalists, angel investors,
and attorneys concerning the role of patents in private, venture-backed
software firms. '6 From these interviews, Mann draws several conclu-
sions. First, he finds that patenting does not significantly benefit the
ability of these firms, especially those at very early stages, to earn super-
normal profits, because the firms typically have not commercialized their
patents.' 6' Buttressing this result is the finding that these young firms
cannot afford to enforce their patents.162 Mann also recounts that
interviewees believed that software patents-especially "product" pat-
ents-are easy to "design around" with non-infringing technology and
are subject to rapid obsolescence, further diminishing their value." On
the other hand, Mann notes that a number of his later-stage interviewees
file for patents to "barter" in cross-licensing agreements and to generate
(often significant) revenue from one-way licensing.'" Second, Mann
concludes that patents substantially distract these firms "from the central
task of designing and deploying a product."'6 Third, he finds that patents
157. See sources cited supra note 41.
158. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Commentary, The Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit: Visitation and Custody of Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 28
(2007); Harold C. Wegner, Commentary, Making Sense of KSR and Other Patent Cases, 106
MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 39 (2007).
159. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Patent Litigation Explosion (Boston Univ.
Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 05-18, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=831685
(arguing that the threat of litigation rises for companies that spend more on R&D, file more
patents, and are publicly traded).
160. See Mann, supra note 27.
161. See id. at 978-79.
162. See id. at 981.
163. See id. at 978-79, 988.
164. Id. at 985-86, 990.
165. Id. at 962, 983.
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can play important "signaling" roles in later-stage fundraising and exit
events, such as IPOs or acquisitions, or even in bankruptcy.'" Fourth, he
finds little to no evidence that patent thickets-large groups of third-
party patents that potentially block innovators from performing research,
development, and commercialization-have hindered the innovation of
young software firms.6 ' Although Mann's study filled an important gap
in the literature, because of the small size of his non-random sample, the
results may not accurately represent the population of venture-backed
software companies. Indeed, as we explain in Part III, our data cast seri-
ous doubt on a few of his findings.
In a similar study in Denmark, Lee Davis interviewed 34 very small
firms (averaging about 20 employees) in the telecommunications, soft-
ware, and biotechnology industries to determine their patenting behavior
and strategy.6" Davis found that many software companies did not pat-
ent, because their managers felt their inventions "did not fulfil [sic] the
criteria of patentability."'69 Additionally, relative to other industries,
software firms found the process of patenting to be a distraction from
core R&D activities.O Managers of biotechnology firms, on the other
hand, reported high rates of patenting and noted the importance of pat-
ents to investors."' Furthermore, Davis found that biotechnology firms
engaged in sophisticated strategies, such as filing for patents to create
preemptive fences around existing technologies and to block competitors
from improving their products.I72 For telecommunications firms, respon-
dents reported higher rates of patenting for product than process
inventions, because of the relative ease of reverse engineering product
inventions by competitors.1' Although these findings are valuable, like
Mann's interviews, the small number of respondents makes interpreta-
tion problematic. Moreover, the restricted (at best) availability of
software patents in Europe causes Davis' results to be of less assistance
in understanding patenting by U.S. software entrepreneurs.
166. See id. at 993-96, 998. However, Mann perceives no "information benefits" from
patents to pre-revenue startup companies. See id. at 998.
167. See id. at 1002-09.
168. See Lee Davis, How Do Small, High-Tech Firms Manage the Patenting Process?
(DRUID Summer Conference on Knowledge, Innovation and Competitiveness, Working
Paper No. 164, 2006), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewabstract.php?id=
164&cf=8. For a more general discussion of studies on patenting by entrepreneurial firms in
Europe, see ZHANAR SAKIEvA, THE USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BY SMALL- AND MID-
DLE-SIZED ENTERPRISES (2009).
169. Davis, supra note 168, at 11.
170. See id. at 14.
171. See id. at 12.
172. See id.
173. See id.
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2. Assessments of Archival Data
Other studies have mined publicly available archival data to eluci-
date the role of patenting in the evolution of small companies. Josh
Lerner examined the patenting behavior of young biotechnology firms
and found an inverse relationship between companies' decisions to
patent and increasing patent litigation costs.17 4 In particular, he found that
firms with relatively little litigation experience and low paid-in capital-
factors that he used as proxies for the increased burden of potential liti-
gation costs on the firm-avoided patenting in more competitive
technological fields.'7 - Additionally, he showed that firms sensitive to
litigation costs tend to avoid technological fields dominated by less cost-
sensitive firms. Thus, based on Lemer's results, it appears that less
battle-worn, less well-capitalized firms tend to channel their patenting
activity to relatively untapped technological areas.
A number of studies have examined the relationship between entre-
preneurs' patenting and financing. David Hsu and Rosemarie Ziedonis
used existing data to demonstrate that, for early-stage semiconductor
companies, holding patents is associated with higher valuations by inves-
tors.'" In a complementary study, lain Cockburn and Megan MacGarvie
found that the growth in software patenting has prolonged the funding
cycle for some companies, and determined that companies' IPOs may be
delayed in technologies characterized by dense patenting.7 Similarly,
Ronald Mann and Tom Sager showed that increased patenting by a given
software company is significantly correlated with total investment, the
number of financing rounds, and firm longevity.'"9 Several other studies
have yielded similar results. *
In sum, while these studies are illustrative of small-firm patenting,
they do not systematically address the drivers of patenting by startups.'
174. Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 463 passim
(1995).
175. See id. at 465, 478 (using patenting by large rival firms as a measure of technologi-
cal competitiveness); see also lain M. Cockburn & Megan J. MacGarvie, Entry, Exit, and
Patenting in the Software Industry (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12563, 2006), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2563 (finding software firms less
likely to enter product markets characterized by large numbers of patents); Paul Almeida &
Bruce Kogut, The Exploration of Technological Diversity and the Geographic Localization of
Innovation, 9 SMALL Bus. EcoN. 21, 21-22, 27-28 (1997) (finding that small semiconductor
firms tend to produce innovations in "smaller, less crowded fields" of technology).
176. See Lerner, supra note 174, at 465, 483-84.
177. See Hsu & Ziedonis, supra note 54.
178. See Cockburn & MacGarvie, supra note 55.
179. Mann & Sager, supra note 56.
180. See sources cited supra note 56.
181. Moreover, because these studies relied upon archival data, they are at best a proxy
for firm strategy and behavior.
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Unfortunately, other than data on issued patents and pending applica-
tions available from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, there has
been no comprehensive data available on the dynamics of U.S. firm pat-
enting, licensing, and litigation among startup companies. However, as
we discuss next, a few studies have examined select aspects of small
firm patenting, especially in Europe.
3. Surveying Small Firm Patenting
Giorgio Sirilli surveyed inventors in Italy in the 1980s, mainly focus-
ing on their personal backgrounds and invention processes.18 2 However,
in the course of this work, he asked why inventors' firms filed for pat-
ents. Sirilli found that for firms of twenty or fewer employees
(representing about 110 inventor respondents), 59.3% filed their patents
for "protection against competition," 29.2% for "profits from sale or li-
cence concessions," and 11.5% for "marketing promotion."' For firms
with 21-500 employees (representing about 120 inventor respondents),
the figures were 70.5%, 16.4%, and 13.1%, respectively.'8 For firms
with over 500 employees (representing about 100 inventor respondents),
the numbers were 80.4%, 15.7%, and 3.9%, respectively., Sirilli inter-
prets "protection against competition" as smaller firms' ability to obtain
a "monopoly over the technology which could be exploited by others,"
indicating that while these firms use patents as a mechanism for main-
taining supernormal profits, they are somewhat less concerned with
doing so than larger ones.'8 6 It is interesting to note in these results that,
at least in Italy in the 1980s, patenting by small- and medium-sized com-
panies tended to be more focused on "marketing promotion"-a
reputational basis-than their larger counterparts.
In the late 1990s, William Kingston undertook a survey of patent-
holding European small- and medium-sized enterprises ("SMEs") to as-
sess their ability to enforce their patents.' 7 He identified over 4,000
SMEs holding at least one patent issued from 1994-1997, of which
nearly 600 completed questionnaires. While the survey focused on
182. See Giorgio Sirilli, Patents and Inventors: An Empirical Study, 16 RES. POL'Y 157,
158 (1987).
183. Id. at 165.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 166.
187. See wILLIAM KINGSTON, OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBL'NS OF THE EUR. COMMUNI-
TIES, ENFORCING SMALL FIRMS' PATENT RIGHTS (2000), ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/
innovation-policy/studies/studies-enforcing-firms-patent rights.pdf.
188. See id. at 8. SMEs are similar to "small entities" in the United States, which gener-
ally have fewer than 500 employees. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2009); 13 C.F.R. § 121.802
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enforcement of issued patents, some of his findings suggest smaller
firms' reasons for patenting. Kingston found that the cost of litigation
had a "very big" effect on decisions to invest in invention for 13% of the
respondents and a "significant" effect for 36% of them. "9 He also noted
that in telephone and personal interviews, employees at small firms re-
ported suffering from noticeable levels of distraction in undergoing the
. 190patenting process.
Also in the late 1990s, a U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA)
report surveyed nearly 200 small firms in the automation, biotechnology,
materials, subassemblies, testing and measurement, and telecommunica-
tions industries, of which about twenty-five percent were less than ten
years old.19' Although the survey did not ask respondents why they pat-
ented, it did ask them to address possible limitations of patent
protection.192 The most important reason given was that enforcement
costs were too high, followed (in descending order of importance) by the
ease of inventing around the patent, the expense of acquiring a patent,
and the rapid pace of technological change making patents obsolete.'93
More recently, several researchers surveyed European inventors
listed on more than 9,000 European Patent Office patents in the "PatVal"
study.' 4 Although the study did not examine why inventors and their
firms filed for patents, it did ask how issued patents were ultimately
used. For small firms of less than 100 employees (representing about
1,200 respondents), 56% used the patents "internally," i.e., to prevent
copying and to maintain supernormal profits; 15% out-licensed the pat-
ents to others for commercialization; 6.9% used the patents both
(2009). In Europe, however, "small entities" are limited to 250 or fewer employees. See KING-
STON, supra note 187, at 17.
189. See KINGSTON, supra note 187, at 9.
190. See id. at 40-41. As an extension to this survey work, Kingston and Kevin Scally
later investigated characteristics of small firm patenting from 1994 to 2003 by examining
Patent Office databases in a variety of countries, including the United States, OECD countries,
Israel and Taiwan. See WILLIAM KINGSTON & KEVIN SCALLY, PATENTS AND THE MEASURE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: NEW DATA ON THE USE OF PATENTS BY
UNIVERSITIES, SMALL FIRMS AND INDIVIDUAL INVENTORS 3-11, 93 (2006). While this study
focused on total patent counts, citations, and other characteristics of issued small firm patents,
it did not investigate why firms decide to file for patents (or not). Cf Fernand Amesse et al.,
The Individual Inventor and the Role of Entrepreneurship, 20 RES. POL'Y 251 (1991) (survey-
ing individual inventors but not addressing why inventors file for patents).
191. JOSEPH J. CORDES ET AL., U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., A SURVEY OF HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY FIRMS, 10, 13 (1999), www.sba.gov/advo/research/rsl89tot.pdf.
192. See id. at 55-59.
193. See id. at 58.
194. ALFoNSo GAMBARDELLA ET AL., EUR. COMM'N, STUDY ON EVALUATING THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY - WHAT ARE PATENTS ACTUALLY WORTH? THE VALUE OF PATENTS
FOR TODAY'S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24 (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/indprop/
docs/patent/studies/patentstudy-report en.pdf.
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internally and for out-licensing; 3.9% cross-licensed them; 9.6% used
them to strategically block competitors; and 8.8% put them to no use.
Compared with medium-sized and large firms, small firms showed much
higher rates of out-licensing and cross-licensing, but much lower rates of
non-use and blocking competitors. 96
Unlike the large firm studies and anecdotal accounts, these studies
begin to address the drivers of patenting by entrepreneurs. Nonetheless,
they are subject to significant limitations. First, the Sirilli and SBA stud-
ies included very small numbers of respondents (about 200-250) across
a variety of industries.'7 Although larger than the sample sizes used in
Mann's and Davis' interviews of startup firms, the industry breadth may
be too wide and the number or respondents too small to guarantee gener-
alizable results. Second, while the recent PatVal study of European firms
included about 1,200 small firm respondents, the sample was composed
solely of inventors to whom patents had been issued.'99 By excluding
firms with no patents and collecting answers solely from scientists and
engineers--employees who may not be driving the patenting process-
this study may be biased. Third, although all of these studies focused on
small firms, the samples were not limited to young firms, instead includ-
ing firms of all ages. Fourth, two of the studies were limited to firms
based in Europe, where incentives to patent likely differ from those in
the United States. Thus, these studies-like the large-firm surveys and
anecdotal literature-provide valuable background to the questions at
hand, but not definitive findings.
C. Summarizing the Results
Although a systematic study of the drivers of patenting by entrepre-
neurs has been lacking, we summarize previous relevant studies in Table
1. This table provides a summary of not only the studies described ear-
lier, but also several others, focusing on those surveys that examined in
any way the reasons for companies to patent. The target sample and year
of the study is listed in the heading column (with a parenthetical to indi-
cate whether the data relate to product or process inventions, when
applicable). Each reason assessed in a given study is ranked according to
its overall importance to patenting as stated by the respondents.'"
195. See id. at 43, 104 tbl.A.2.
196. See id. at 43 tbl.3.13.
197. CORDES ET AL., supra note 191, at 10; see Sirilli, supra note 182, at 158.
198. GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 194, at 24, 104 tbl.A.2.
199. Many of the studies used different response scales and types. In order to compare
responses across the studies, we have ordered the responses for each study according to nu-
merical rankings.
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Categories marked "N/A" indicate that the option was not offered to the
respondents in the corresponding survey.200
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF STUDIES EXAMINING MOTIVES TO PATENT
Study of
OECD Mainly
Study of Large Study of Carnegie Study of Study of
Very Large German German Study of UK Mellon Study Study of Large Swiss Cos.
Cos. Cos. Cos. and Japanese of U.S. Cos. French Cos. European (Products)
(2003 (2002). (1997Y' Cos. (1994r (1994 (1993)' Cos. (1993r (1988)"
Prevent Copying N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Preemptive Patenting" 3 2,4 2,3 2 2,3 2 3 5
Negotiating/Cross- 1,2 7,9 4 3 4 2 2 3
Licensing/Firm
Reputation/Litigation
Defense
Signaling: Technical & N/A 3 6 N/A 5 N/A N/A N/A
Product Image
Signaling: Employee 4 8 5 N/A 7 6 6 6
Performance
Signaling: 6 6,10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Financing/Capital
Secure License Fees 5 11 7 4 6 4 4 1
Entry into Foreign N/A 5 N/A N/A N/A 5 5 4
Markets r 5__1
As Table I indicates, the top reason for patenting across all studies
was to prevent copying. Although copying is not required for a patent in-
fringement claim, this rationale may be broadly understood as reflecting
200. A few minor categories on some of the surveys have been omitted. When overall
scores were identical, the numerical ranking shown in the table is the same.
201. Specifically, the OECD study asked about changes in the significance of these fac-
tors in the last ten years. See Blind, supra note 153, at 659.
202. See id. at 662-63.
203. See id. at 659 (citing WISSENSVERBREITUNG UND DIFFUSIONSDYNAMIK IM
SPANNUNGSFELD ZWISCHEN INNOVIERENDEN UND IMITIERENDEN UNTERNEHMEN (H.J.
Schalk et al., eds., 1999)).
204. See Robert H. Pitkethly, Intellectual Property Strategy in Japanese and UK Com-
panies: Patent Licensing Decisions and Learning Opportunities, 30 RES. POL'Y 425, 432
(2001).
205. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 4, 47 fig.7, 48 fig.8 (noting that the available
data in their working paper are restricted to larger companies in their sample).
206. See EMMANNUEL DUGUET & ISABELLE KABLA, APPROPRIATION STRATEGY AND
THE MOTIVATIONS TO USE THE PATENT SYSTEM IN FRANCE 28, tbl.6 (Working Paper G9717,
1997), available at http://www.insee.fr/en/themes/document.asp?reg-id--O&id=260.
207. See ARUNDEL, supra note 152.
208. See Najib Harabi, Appropriability of Technical Innovations: An Empirical Analysis,
24 RES. PoL'Y 981, 990 (1995).
209. Some studies divide preemptive patenting in "offensive" and "defensive" variants,
depending on whether the preemption is used to "block" other firms from practicing their
technologies or to merely prevent other firms from encroaching upon the patentee's own en-
deavors. See Blind, supra note 153, at 659. We report both categories together for those
studies.
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the classical reason of maintaining supracompetitive prices by preventing
competitors from selling the same or a substitute product.2 () The next most
common reasons-with the exception of the results of the 2003 study of
German companies-were acquiring patents for cross-licensing and for
other defensive reasons as well as preemptive patenting to maintain free-
dom to operate and to block competitors from improving their products.
Signaling and entry into foreign markets followed, with securing licensing
fees coming last or near-to-last in almost all of the surveys.
In Table 2, we summarize findings of reasons not to patent, including
studies that examined why patents might be of limited effectiveness, as the
two topics tend to overlap. Again, when a category is marked "N/A," that
option was not offered to the respondents in the corresponding survey.
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF STUDIES ON REASONS NOT TO PATENT
Carnegie Mellon Yale Study of
U.S. SBA Study of Study of Swiss Study of (Mainly) Large Companies
Small Cos. Cos. (Products) Large U.S. Study of French (Products)
(1998)" (1995)" Cos.(1994)" Cos. (1993)" (1987)21
Ease of Inventing Around Patent 2 1 1 1 1
Reluctant to Disclose Information N/A 2 3 2 4
Required for Patenting
Not Patentable (general) N/A 3 N/A N/A 2
Not Patentable (invalid for novelty, 1 6 5 3 3
obviousness, or other reasons)
Difficulty and Costs of Enforcing 3 4 3
Patent
Difficulty and Costs of Acquiring 6 6, 10 N/A N/A N/A
Patent
Technological Change Too Rapid 4 5 N/A N/A 6
for Patent to Be Effective
Entry into Foreign Markets N/A 5 N/A N/A N/A
Did Not Want to Become Subject to N/A 7 N/A N/A 8
Legal Restrictions on Licensing
(e.g., compulsory licensing)
Already Cooperating with N/A 8 N/A N/A 7
Competitors (e.g., through joint
ventures or cross-licenses)
As Table 2 indicates, the most common reason for not filing a patent
application is the ease of inventing around the patent's claims, except for
the study that focused on small firms, which placed the costs and
210. Alternatively, supracompetitive profits may arise by preventing competitors from
lowering their costs of production or distribution of a given product. See supra Part IA.
211. See CORDES, supra note 191, at 55-58.
212. See Harabi, supra note 208, at 988. Harabi's study examined why patents might be
of limited effectiveness. See id.
213. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 45 fig.5.
214. See DUGUET & KABLA, supra note 206, at 28 tbl.7.
215. See Levin et al., supra note 143, at 803 tbl.5. Levin's study examined why patents
might be of limited effectiveness. See id.
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difficulty of enforcing the patent as the primary obstacle to filing."'6 The
next reasons (in descending order of importance) were the reluctance to
disclose the information required for patenting and the perceived lack of
patentability of the invention, with the remaining reasons seeming to
follow no particular pattern.
III. THE DESIGN, RESPONSE RATES, AND RESPONDENT
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 2008 BERKELEY PATENT SURVEY
A. The Sample and Survey Design
Prompted by the lack of adequate data and the changing patent envi-
ronment, the authors and other investigators developed and administered
the first targeted survey in the United States of startup and early-stage
companies' interactions with the patent system. Formally titled the "The
2008 Berkeley Patent Survey: Entrepreneurial Companies and the Patent
System," it includes a variety of questions centered on how patenting,
patent licensing, and patent litigation relate to company innovation, capi-
tal formation, business strategies, competition, and alternative forms of
intellectual property protection."
The survey was administered by mail, e-mail/Internet, and telephone
from June 2008 through December 2008 to top managers at over 15,000
U.S. "entrepreneurial companies"-i.e., firms that were founded in the
United States during the last ten years 2 8-in the biotechnology, medical
device, software and Internet, and hardware (including computer, semi-
conductor, and telecommunications equipment) sectors.2 9 Our sample
frame was drawn from two prominent databases-Dun & Bradstreet
216. See Enno Masurel, Patenting Behaviour by SMEs, 2 INT. J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
INNOVATION MGMT. 574, 574 (2002) (reporting that Dutch small- and medium-sized enter-
prises found patenting costs "too high").
217. For a description of the survey's genesis, including the rigorous process used to
develop and test the survey, see Graham & Sichelman, supra note 21, at 1091-96. A portion of
this section is adapted from that article. See id.
218. Our research team understood that there are varying conceptions of the "entrepre-
neur" and "entrepreneurial firm." See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra
note 16, at 1266-67. After much consideration, we decided to follow Daniel Spulber's view of
entrepreneurs as those persons central to the formation of new firms, thereby focusing on the
young company as the unit of analysis. See id. (citing DANIEL F. SPULBER, THE THEORY OF
THE FIRM: MICROECONOMICS WITH ENDOGENOUS ENTREPRENEURS, FIRMS, MARKETS, AND
ORGANIZATIONS 156-57 (2009)).
219. Our analysis of companies that received venture funding during the last ten years
shows that over 75% are classified into the primary industries "information" (61%) and
"health" (15%). VENTUREXPERT (THOMSON), http://vx.thomsonib.com/NASApp/VxComponent/
VXMain.jsp. (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). For the hardware industry, we only sampled venture-
backed firms. Because of the large number of software firms founded during the period of inter-
est, we randomly selected 25% of those firms to include in our sample.
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(D&B) and VentureXpert (VX) (Thomson)-using both the Standard
Industry Classification (SIC) and North American Industry Classification
System (NAICS) to identify companies in relevant industries. The survey
spanned about thirty questions, including several on motivations to pat-
ent220 and to forgo patenting.21 Additionally, we inquired about each
respondent company's background, revenues, number of employees, in-
novation focus, and patent ownership and use.
Based upon our interviews and a review of the literature, we hy-
pothesized before collecting our data that "securing investment" would
rank highly on the list, along with "preventing others from copying." For
later-stage startups, we predicted that "improving chances/quality of
liquidity" and "obtaining licensing revenues" would play a greater
role than for early-stage companies. We also stated that we would be
220. The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey: Entrepreneurial Companies and the Patent Sys-
tem (on file with authors). The question regarding motivations to patent read as follows:
Q: How important or unimportant have the following been to your company in
seeking patent protection in the United States:
Moderately Not at all
Very Important Important Slightly Important Important
Preventing others from copying our products orservices O 0
Improving our chances of securing investment D 0 D 0
Obtaining licensing revenues U 0 0 0
Improving chances/qualty of liquidity (e.g., acquisitiornIPO) D C U 0
Preventing patent infrngement actions against us 0 0l 0 0
Improving negotiating position with other companies (for 0 0 0 O
example, cross-licensing)
Enhancing company's reputation/product image 01 0 01 U
Other (specify) O 0 0 a
221. Id. The questions on forgoing patenting read as follows:
Ql: Thinking about the last major technology innovation that your company did
not patent, which if any of the following influenced your company's decision
not to patent? (Please check 4 ALL that apply)
a. Did not want to disclose information O
b. Cost of getting the patent, including attorneys' fees U
c. Competitors could have asily invented around the patent U
d. Believed that rade secret was adequate protection D
e. Cost of enforcing the patent, including actions incourt 0
f. Did not believe the technology was patentable D
g. No need for legal protection U
Q2: Which of these was the most important reason not to patent?
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"somewhat surprised" if many startups were filing for patents to im-
prove their position in negotiations, such as cross-licensing deals. 22
B. Response Rates and Respondent Characteristics
1. Survey Response Rates
Overall, our response rate for firms actually residing at the ad-
dress provided from our data sources is 9.8%-specifically, 8.3% for
Dun & Bradstreet firms and 12.4% for VentureXpert firms. 2 23 Addi-
tionally, when we conducted our phone campaign-calling about
13% of our initial non-respondents-many phone lines had been dis-
connected and numerous addressees (to whom we had mailed the
initial survey) had moved. Taking these factors into account, our ef-
fective response rate increases to 12.3%-specifically, 10.7% for
D&B firms and 16.6% for VX firms. Within industries, our effective
response rate for D&B biotechnology and medical device firms was
23.7% (105 responses total); for VX biotechnology and medical de-
vice firms, 24.2% (139 responses); for D&B software and Internet
firms, 8.9% (535 responses); and for VX software, Internet, and
hardware firms, 15.6% (242 responses).
Although these response rates are low, rates of this magnitude are
fairly common for surveys of small firms.224 Indeed, given that the
majority of respondents were CEOs and CTOs, whose time is in high
demand in the startup environment, we believe that our response rates
would likely have been difficult to increase. Of course, any low re-
sponse rate raises the potential for bias and skew, which we discuss in
the next section.
2. Characteristics of Respondents
Using data from Dun & Bradstreet, Thomson's VentureXpert, and
the U.S. Patent Office, we were able to compare several different
variables of our respondent and non-respondent samples. We tested
the mean statistics on attributes such as age, size, geographic loca-
tion, and patents held-and, when available, annual revenue and
features of the company's venture funding. Generally, the differences
in these variables are not statistically significant at conventional levels.
Some notable exceptions are geography (in general, our respondents
222. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 21, at 1096.
223. For additional discussion of response rates, see Graham et al., High Technology
Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1271-1272.
224. See CORDES ET AL., supra note 191, at 10-11 (reporting response rates of 3.8% to
31% on small firm surveys).
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exhibit a "western" bias, with relatively more of our respondent com-
panies coming from the West Coast than the non-respondents), and
firm size for medical device firms, which tend to be smaller on average
in employee count than non-respondents. However, this difference is
primarily driven by large outliers; at the median, our respondent medi-
cal device firms have the same number of employees as our
non-respondents (five).22 5 There are also differences in the levels of pat-
enting and firm revenues-notably in the software sector, which
suggest that higher-revenue, higher-patenting firms were more likely to
answer our survey-although not at statistically significant levels.22
Despite these exceptions, our overall findings of little to no significant
difference in age, size, and patenting suggest that our respondent com-
panies are not different from the entire random sample of companies, at
least in terms of these important characteristic attributes.227
It is important to recognize, too, that any bias in our sample is
likely present-and in many instances to a greater degree-in
previous surveys. First, no previous study tested characteristics of
their respondent sample against their non-respondent sample. For
225. When we compare the number of employees reported by D&B in their 2008 data,
medical device respondents in the D&B sample had an average of fourteen employees versus
thirty-eight employees among the non-respondents (significant at the 90% confidence inter-
val).
226. Issued patents were determined by examining and comparing data supplied from
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office databases current through July 22, 2008. See Weekly Bib-
liographic Information for Patent Grants and Published Patent Applications, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/products/catalog/patent-services/patdata.jsp (last
visited November 12, 2010). We also examined the number of published patent applications
starting in the year 2001 using the same data. See id.
In a study by Mann and Sager of venture-backed software and biotechnology companies
that received their first rounds of funding in 1996-1998, using Patent Office assignment data,
they found that as of the end of 2004, biotechnology firms held an average of 5.5 patents.
Mann & Sager, supra note 56, at 197. Using Patent Office data, our figures show 4.4 patents
for respondent VentureXpert biotechnology firms and 3.8 patents for non-respondent Ventur-
eXpert firms of comparable age. Given the average firm age for our sample is about 5.5 years,
which is about a year less than Mann and Sager's average firm age, these numbers accord
quite well. Mann and Sager also found that software firms held an average of 0.7 patents. See
id. at 197. Using Patent Office data, our figures showed 0.5 patents for respondent VentureX-
pert computer software, computer services, and Internet firms and 0.7 patents for comparable
non-respondent VentureXpert firms.
As we note elsewhere, in general, the number of patents and applications reported to be
held by respondent firms greatly exceeds the number of average patents and applications as
evidenced by the USPTO databases. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra
note 16, at 1275. These differences appear to stem primarily from respondents not recording
assignments on the USPTO databases. See id. at 1274-76.
227. For further discussion of non-respondent bias testing, see Graham et al., High Tech-
nology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1272-74; Stuart Graham & Ted Sichelman, Patents
and Innovating Startups: Analysis of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey (Nov. 24, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract= 1512726.
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example, the frequently cited Carnegie Mellon and Yale Surveys-
although they had response rates of about 50%-disclosed no
analysis comparing company size, revenues, market capitalization,
patenting rates, or other important characteristics of respondents with
non-respondents. Second, many prior surveys-especially those un-
dertaken in Europe-drew their samples only from firms with at least
one patent, completely ignoring firms that had either never applied
for patents or whose applications had been rejected. Conversely, our
survey captured non-patenting innovators: For example, a large per-
centage of our D&B software and Internet firm respondents, 76%,
reported holding no patents whatsoever.
Finally, as another test for bias, we used a variety of statistical
methods to compare the results of the responses we received from our
mailings and e-mails (approximately 1,200) versus those responding
to our telephone re-sampling (approximately 130).228 In this regard, in
the first phase of contacting sample firms, we only used mail and e-
mail; thus, the firms contacted later by phone can be viewed as a
"non-respondent" sample set.229 Moreover, unlike our mail and e-mail
respondents, most of the telephone-based respondents received (and,
to a large degree, required) incentive payment in the form of gift cer-
tificates in order to motivate their responses.23 0 Thus, our comparison
set of telephone respondents very likely does not comprise "responsi-
ble, good citizens that take surveys" 23'-reflecting instead a group
that, despite repeated requests, did not initially respond to our survey.
Importantly, based on our testing to date, we have found no statisti-
cally significant differences between the responses of these two
groups-including comparisons just of software firms, which had the
lowest response rates. Given these findings, we believe that we have
by and large' insulated ourselves from the charge that differences in
background characteristics reported above are problematic. In any
event, by segmenting our responses by patenting rates and total reve-
nue, we are able to discern and generally compensate for several
228. See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 227.
229. We contacted the original respondents by email and mail from June to August 2008.
Telephoning the non-respondents began in September 2008. As mentioned earlier, we at-
tempted to contact about 13% of these non-respondents by telephone.
230. After testing, we determined that a large share of the telephoned sample needed to
be motivated by a guaranteed prize-in this case, a $25-50 gift certificate for Amazon.com-
to take the survey.
231. Statement by James Pooley, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, to the authors (Feb. 26,
2009) (remarking that the sample may comprise only those "responsible, good citizens that
take surveys").
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potential sources of bias. We have done so below and comment on
these effects in our analysis.232
IV. MAJOR RESULTS REGARDING MOTIVATIONS
AND HINDRANCES TO PATENTING
In this section, we describe the major findings of our study re-
garding startups' motivations to patent their inventions as well as the
reasons they decide to forgo patenting.
A. Preventing Copying is the Primary Driver of Patenting
Respondents reported that preventing others from copying their
products and services was their primary reason to seek patent protec-
tion.233 (See Fig. 1.) This motivation remained paramount for cohorts
segmented by a variety of characteristics, including dataset (i.e., Dun
& Bradstreet and VentureXpert), industry, age, patenting intensity,
and total revenues. 234 (See Figs. 2-4.) Thus, we believe that this find-
ing is extremely robust in our data.
232. This discussion assumes, of course, that differences are largely captured by observ-
able characteristics like employees, revenues, and geographical location. There may be
unobservable characteristics that drive the use of patenting; our testing cannot account for this
possibility.
233. The mean for this response was statistically different from the next most important
(securing investment) at a 99% confidence level. When we report confidence levels herein, we
describe differences as either at a 90%, 95%, or 99% level, but an actual confidence level may
be higher than the reported value.
234. Although high-revenue firms listed preventing copying as the top reason for patent-
ing, those firms rated this reason as less important than low-revenue firms (at 99% confidence
level). Because firms with greater revenues have more to lose from copying, this result might
seem paradoxical. Yet, examined in view of high-revenue firms' other responses, it becomes
sensible; namely, high-revenue firms find patenting less, or of about equal, importance as low-
revenue firms for nearly all other listed reasons for patenting. See infra Figure 1. One possible
explanation for this result is that the high-revenue firms have more complementary assets,
such as developed sales and marketing channels, which reduce their reliance on patenting,
than firms with less or no revenue. See Teece, supra note 51.
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FIGURE 1
REASONS FOR SEEKING PATENT PROTECTION.m' How IMPORTANT OR
UNIMPORTANT HAVE THE FOLLOWING BEEN TO YOUR COMPANY IN
SEEKING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES?
Prevent Others from Copying 3.59
Improve Chances of Securing Investment 3.27
Obtain Licensing Revenues 2.4
Improve Chances/Ouality of Liquidity 3.23
Prevent Patent Infringement Actions 2.93
Improve Negotiating Position 2.95
Enhance Company's Reputation 3.12
1 2 3 4
(1=Not At All Important, 2=Slightly Important, 3=Moderately Important, 4=Very Important)
This result is notable because some previous commentators had
opined that the high costs of patenting and enforcing patents generally
precluded startups from using patents to prevent copying and competi-
tion.236 Yet, in line with these commentators, our respondents also
indicated that the primary barriers to patenting (on their last major un-
patented invention) were precisely the high costs of filing and
enforcement.237 This raises a potential dilemma: if startups are highly
sensitive to the costs of patenting and enforcement-which can run to mil-
lions of dollars-then how can preventing copying and competition be the
primary driver of startup patenting?
235. Because this question was limited to respondents that had previously filed at least
one patent application, it foreclosed many respondents from answering, so the total respondent
size is 559 firms. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows: prevent oth-
ers from copying (0.03); improve chances of securing investment (0.04); obtain licensing
revenues (0.05); improve chances/quality of liquidity event (0.04); prevent patent infringement
actions against us (0.05); improve negotiating position (0.04); and enhance company's reputa-
tion (0.04).
236. See Mann, supra note 27, at 981 (finding that the benefits of patenting to earning
supernormal profits are weak for startup software firms, especially for ones at very early
stages); cf Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45
Hous. L. REV. 1201, 1233 (2008) ("Relative to large firms, small firms face two problems
enforcing their IP rights. First, they incur a higher ratio of fixed enforcement cost to variable
enforcement cost. Second, they are more likely to face liquidity constraints that influence
enforcement activity.").
237. See infra Part IV.E. Indeed, on average, startups appear to pay roughly double the
average for a granted patent. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note
16, at 1311 (reporting that respondent startup firms spend over $38,000 per issued patent).
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Wesley Cohen, who administered the Carnegie Mellon survey of pri-
marily large firms in the 1990s, remarked that our result regarding
"preventing copying" possibly reflected "socially desirable response
bias."23 8 Specifically, he raised the issue that respondents may have subjec-
tively believed that the primary policy justification for patents is to prevent
copying and simply answered accordingly in their firm-specific re-
sponses. 23 9 Although such a bias might be reflected in our results, there are
several reasons to believe that our finding represents actual firm behavior.
First, each decision to file for a patent (or not) involves unique cost-
benefit trade-offs. Specifically, while startup firms may be cost-sensitive in
general, which prevents filing for patents on many innovations, there is
another set of innovations for which the benefits of filing, particularly
those stemming from preventing copying, outweigh the costs of filing and
expected enforcement costs. The benefits of patenting related to prevent-
ing competition will generally vary depending on (1) the expected level of
consumer demand for (or cost-savings attributable to) the innovation; (2)
the ease of reverse-engineering and copying the innovation; (3) the nature
and degree of competition (and potential copying) in the marketplace; (4)
the risk profiles of the innovator and its competitors; and (5) the relative
amounts of capital the innovator and potential infringers have available to
enforce a patent or defend against a claim of patent infringement. Because
of the varying nature of these calculations with respect to each specific
innovation, it is not inconsistent for our firms to answer that preventing
competition-which depends at least to some extent on enforcement-is
the primary reason for patenting, while cost is the primary reason for for-
going patenting.
In this regard, firms that answered the "motivations to patent" ques-
tion necessarily had filed for at least one patent and application, while
firms that had never filed for a patent answered the "motivation not to pat-
ent" question. When the respondents for this latter question are segmented
by patenting propensity, the importance of cost drops substantially for
firms with greater patenting intensity-so much so that cost is no longer
the primary reason for forgoing patenting. (See Fig. 5 below.) Thus, there
may be one class of firms for which the costs of filing and enforcement are
simply too high to justify patenting their innovations, and another class for
238. Statement by Wesley Cohen, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, to the authors
(July 22, 2009). See generally Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, Socially-Desirable Re-
sponse and Acquiescence in a Cross- Cultural Survey of Mental Health, 25 J. HEALTH & Soc.
BEHAV. 189 (1984) (noting the incidence of socially desirable response bias). Further support
for such a view is lent by our positioning the "preventing copying" choice as first in the appli-
cable survey question.
239. Statement by Wesley Cohen, supra note 238.
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which the cost-benefit ratio is quite different, presumably justifying pat-
enting primarily to prevent copying and competition.
Second, because patents last twenty years from the date of filing,
startup firms need not immediately file an infringement suit in order for a
patent to play a primary role in preventing copying. Rather, the only im-
mediate cost to patenting is the cost of filing, which often stretches over
several years. Only upon the success of the patented product or process
and detected infringement by others-which typically occurs years after
filing-will the patentee want to undertake more costly enforcement ac-
tivities. By that point, the startup may be generating significant revenue
and profits, allowing it to fund litigation more easily, or it may have been
acquired by a larger, cash-rich firm. For instance, nearly 10% of our re-
spondents had already undergone an acquisition. In this sense, by filing for
a patent, startup firms are buying an option to enforce. Importantly, the
purchase price of the option is much less expensive than its exercise price.
Thus, when reporting that patents are used primarily to prevent competi-
tion, managers may be taking into account the long-term interests of their
firms.
Third, although litigating to trial is costly, a patentee can often gain
significant leverage merely by sending threat letters or putting an accused
infringer through the initial stages of litigation. Indeed, a recent study by
Gwendolyn Ball and Jay Kesan found that over 50% of patent infringe-
ment suits are filed by small firms-namely, those with revenues of less
than $10 million per year.240 Ball and Kesan thus reject the conventional
wisdom that small firms are not able to enforce their patents in court.241 So,
while the cost of litigating a patent infringement through to trial (roughly
$3-6 million) may generally seem too high for most startups to absorb,
242
effective patent enforcement may occur well short of such expenditures.
In fact, only about 5% of patent actions ever reach trial.243
Fourth, in qualitative interviews with respondents, managers report
"preventing copying" as an important consideration when choosing to pat-
ent. For example, this factor strongly motivated the CEO of a respondent
software firm to file for patents. She created a piece of software and filed a
patent prior to founding her startup in 2003 to market the software. Ulti-
mately, the patent became important to her company's survival and
success. She related:
240. Ball & Kesan, supra note 30, at 13, 33 & tbl.4.
241. See id. at 17.
242. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
243. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH U. L. REv. 237,
254, 273 (2006).
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A large public company copied the code of our product and tried
to sell it on the market [] .... Without my patent, I wouldn't have
been able to stop it. . . . [Ultimately], our company settled on the
courthouse steps-literally-and we got our expenses covered,
picked up a bit of money, and also established a license agreement
244[with the large company] to license it and pay us royalties.
In sum, there are several reasons to believe our results are not infected
with socially desirable response bias. On this basis, our findings suggest
that startup firms are similar to large firms, in that preventing copying is
their dominant reason for patenting.245
B. Securing Financing and Improving Valuation are Important Drivers
Our respondents reported that financing and improving valuation upon
exit-such as an acquisition or IPO246-played a moderately to very im-
portant role in their decision to file for patents.247 (See Fig. 1.) These
results stand in stark contrast to surveys of non-startup companies, in
which respondents ranked patenting for securing capital as relatively un-
important.241 Indeed, our finding is consistent with reports in the Carnegie
Mellon study that smaller firms tended to rank the importance of patenting
to improve firm reputation higher than larger firms.249 Our finding is also
consistent with the studies by social scientists concluding that patenting
plays a positive role in valuation during fundraising and upon exit.250
Like preventing copying, this result is robust across a variety of firm
characteristics, including age, patenting intensity, revenues, type of financ-
ing, and industry. As might be expected, there is a stronger tendency by
the VentureXpert companies-which are primarily funded by venture
capital firms-to rate improving the chances of securing investment and
liquidity events as more important compared with the Dun & Bradstreet
244. Telephone interview with Anonymous Company Executive (Apr. 2009). Interest-
ingly, the CEO related that copyright was not an effective means for her company to enforce
its intellectual property rights against the accused infringer, because of problems surrounding
proof of copying. See id. (In accordance with our human subjects protocol for the survey, we
agreed not to disclose the identities of our interviewees without their express permission. For
further description of post-survey interviews, see Graham et al., High Technology Entrepre-
neurs, supra note 16, at 1277-78.)
245. See supra Part II.C (summarizing results of large-firm surveys).
246. Another important-though, less desirable-exit event that respondents may have
taken into account in responding is bankruptcy. See Nguyen & Maine, Acquiring Innovation,
supra note 57.
247. There were no statistically significant differences between the rankings of securing
investment and improving the liquidity event, but they differ from the next reason-enhancing
company reputation-at a 95% confidence level.
248. See supra Part II.C.
249. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
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companies-which are not generally venture-backed. However, the overall
order of the reasons listed is the same for each sample set as the aggregate
presented in Figure 1.
When respondent firms are segmented by industry, this set of financ-
ing reasons remain the second-most important driver of patenting behind
preventing copying, but important differences arise. (See Fig. 2.)
FIGURE 2
REASONS TO PATENT WITHIN INDUSTRIES.25 How IMPORTANT OR
UNIMPORTANT HAVE THE FOLLOWING BEEN TO YOUR COMPANY IN
SEEKING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES?
Prevent Others from Copying
Improve Chances of Securing Investment
Obtain Licensing Revenues
Improve Chances/Quality of Liquidity
Prevent Patent Infringement Actions
Improve Negotiating Position
Enhance Company's Reputation
3.35
3.57
2.98
3.3
3.09
2.27
2.19
2. 19
J 3
2.99 3
3.34
_j 3.04
3.11
2.98
3.47
3.08
2.81
2.9
J 3.08
3.08
3.18
3.17
2 3
o Biotech a Medical Device a Software n Hardware
(1=Not At All Important, 2=Slightly Important, 3-Moderately Important, 4=Very Important)
Biotechnology and medical device firms list preventing copying as
nearly "very important" overall, while (venture-backed) hardware firms,
251. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (biotech, medical
device, software, hardware): prevent others from copying (0.05, 0.05, 0.06, 0.09); improve
chances of securing investment (0.08, 0.08, 0.07, 0.09); obtain licensing revenues (0.10, 0.11,
0.08, 0.11); improve chances/quality of liquidity event (0.08, 0.09, 0.07, 0.09); prevent patent
infringement actions against us (0.10, 0.09, 0.07, 0.11); improve negotiating position (0.08,
0.09, 0.07, 0.11); and enhance company's reputation (0.08, 0.09, 0.07, 0.09).
3.83
3.81
3.56
3.59
4
J
1I
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and particularly software firms, place less emphasis on this reason
253(though still rating it between "moderately" and "very" important).
Similarly, biotechnology and medical device firms report patenting to
secure investment and to improve the chances and quality of a liquidity
event as more important than (venture-backed) hardware firms do and
much more important than software firms do.254
These results are understandable for several reasons. First, in another
survey question, biotechnology and medical device firms rated patents as
one of the top mechanisms for capturing competitive advantage from
their innovations, while software and Internet companies rated it least
important.255 Arguably, much of the competitive advantage afforded by
patents derives from preventing competitors, or potential licensees, from
freely using the patented innovation. In this regard, even though patent-
holding software and Internet firms rated preventing copying as the pri-
mary reason for filing, they ranked almost all of the reasons for patenting
as comparatively less important than respondents in other industries.
(See Fig. 2.) Second, respondents informed us that investors perceived
the importance of patenting to be substantially more important to their
investment decisions for biotechnology and medical device firms than
software and Internet firms.256 For example, the VentureXpert biotech-
nology respondents reported that 97% of venture capital firms indicated
that patents were important to their decision to invest, while only 59% of
VentureXpert software and Internet firms reported the same.257 Similar
trends held for other types of investors: angel investors (78% for bio-
technology and 36% for software), "other companies" as investors, i.e.,
corporate venture capital (90% and 51%, respectively), and investment
banks (81 % and 40%, respectively).258
These inter-industry differences are generally consistent with previ-
ous studies. For example, the Carnegie Mellon study found that
patenting was a much more important means of securing competitive
advantage to the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries than
252. Our hardware companies are all drawn from the VentureXpert database, while the
samples of biotechnology, medical device, and software firms come from both the Dun &
Bradstreet and VentureXpert lists.
253. Biotechnology and medical device firms showed statistically significant differences
in their mean responses for the importance of preventing copying from hardware and software
firms at a 99% confidence level.
254. Biotechnology and medical device firms showed statistically significant differences
from hardware and software firms at a 99% confidence level.
255. See Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1291-92.
256. See id. at 1308.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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to the electronic component and semiconductor industries.259 However,
our findings appear to contradict Ronald Mann's anecdotal reports that
patenting to maintain supracompetitive pricing is not a viable strategy
for venture-backed startup software firms.2 " Specifically, as noted ear-
lier, the software firms in our sample reported that "preventing
copying"-which may directly relate to maintaining supracompetitive
profits-was "moderately" to "very" important. Moreover, while it is
possible that this difference is explained by our software respondents
patenting at rates slightly higher than non-respondents, when we account
for total company patenting the result does not change qualitatively.261
(See Fig. 4 below.)
To be sure, even though startup firms appear to file patents predomi-
nately to prevent competition, responses to other survey questions show
wide variability among industries in how well patents actually serve this
function. For example, while biotechnology firms report that patents are
the primary means of "capturing competitive advantage" from their in-
novations, software and Internet companies rank patents dead last.262
Similarly, in another set of survey questions, respondents told us that
patents play moderately to very important roles in providing incentives
to innovate to biotechnology firms but only slightly to moderately im-
portant roles for software firms. 263 Thus, our results are not diametrically
opposed to Mann's finding on the usefulness of patents in preventing
copying for software startups, and instead provide a more nuanced pic-
ture of the use of patents in this industry. Moreover, our findings validate
with a randomly-sampled survey Mann's anecdotal observation that
*264
startup software firms can use patents to assist in raising financing.
The inter-industry differences we find in the rated importance of pat-
ents as a means to prevent copying raise a thorny question. Specifically,
are the differences reflected in the importance of patenting for securing
investment and financing mainly driven by (1) the industry-specific utility
of patents in preventing competition, or (2) differences in patents' useful-
ness in acting as signals for other important capabilities within firms, such
as a firm's ability to codify its engineers' knowledge? While these ques-
tions are best answered in a multivariate context with sophisticated
regression analysis, the descriptive statistics here offer some preliminary
answers. Because biotechnology and medical device firms rate patenting
of top importance in appropriating value from their innovations-and
259. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 32 tbl. .
260. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part 1Il.B.2.
262. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs, supra note 16, at 1291-92.
263. See id. at 1286.
264. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
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similarly provide relatively high scores for preventing copying as a rea-
son for filing-this finding may be evidence that the classical reason of
patenting to prevent competition is a major driver of third-party invest-
ment decisions. 265 On the other hand, since software firms rate patenting
as the least effective of various means for appropriating value-and
similarly provide much lower scores for preventing copying as a reason
for filing-this finding may support the view that investor sentiment is
primarily driven by patents' signaling qualities.26 In this regard, that
"enhancing firm reputation" was the only reason rated more highly by
software firms than biotechnology and medical device companies (see
Fig. 2) arguably supports a signaling thesis.
C. Startup Firms, Like Incumbents, Engage in Strategic Patenting
As we noted above, in an earlier article, we stated that we would be
"somewhat surprised" if many startups were filing for patents for strate-
gic reasons, such as defending against patent infringement suits or
improving their position negotiations, such as cross-licensing deals.
We assumed that startup firms, at least outside of the biotechnology in-
dustry, were relatively immune to litigation threats and were primarily
concerned with licensing out their patents to other firms, as opposed to
inbound- or cross-licensing activity. Yet, consistent with the results of the
large-firm surveys, our respondent patenting firms rated these strategic
2611
reasons as "moderately important" in their decision to file for patents.
(See Fig. 1.) This result is a novel and important finding.
Importantly, the smaller firms in our startup sample (as measured by
total revenues) found patenting for strategic reasons nearly as important
as the larger firms. 26 9 (See Fig. 3.)
265. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents. Product Exclusivity, and Information
Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical Research and Development, 72 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 477, 479 (2003) (discussing how the uses of patents vary across industries and
noting that "while, in some contexts, it may be misleading to say patents confer monopoly
power, in pharmaceuticals that statement is pretty accurate").
266. Cf Burk, supra note 59, at 1018 (suggesting that "the presence of the patent system
may tip the scales toward codified rather than tacit transmission" in the software industry,
"where the availability of patents is relatively recent compared to the accumulated tacit
knowledge in the field").
267. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 21, at 1096; see supra Part II.A.
268. While the means of both of these motivations are significantly different at the 99%
confidence level from that of "enhancing reputation," there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences between the two reasons. Taking the less important reason of this group-"preventing
patent actions against us"-there was a statistically significant difference at the 99% confi-
dence level when compared with the next most important reason-licensing.
269. See supra Part II.C.
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FIGURE 3
REASONS TO PATENT BY FIRM REVENUE. 70 How IMPORTANT OR
UNIMPORTANT HAVE THE FOLLOWING BEEN TO YOUR COMPANY IN
SEEKING PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES?
Prevent Others from Copying 3.48 7
Improve Chances of Securing Investment 3 3.44
Obtain Licensing Revenues 2.59
Improve Chances/Ouality of Liquidity 3.13 7
Prevent Patent Infringement Actions 294
.3
Improve Negotiating Position 32.03
Enhance Company's Reputation 3.17
1 2 3 4
m0-300K ai>300K
(1=Not At All Important, 2=Slightly Important, 3-Moderately Important, 4=Very Important)
Specifically, Figure 3 displays patent-holding firms divided into top and
bottom revenue earners (at the sample median of $300,000 per year). As
evident in the average responses, defensive patenting was of exactly the
same importance for high- and low-revenue firms, while patenting to
improve negotiating position was only slightly more important for high-
revenue firms.2 7' Of course, the kinds of negotiations for firms of different
sizes may vary widely-for instance, larger firms may be more apt to bar-
gain over cross-licenses and smaller firms may be more likely to negotiate
one-way licenses. Nevertheless, our evidence tends to undercut the argu-
ment that strategic patenting is merely the province of the largest firms. We
do find, however, that firms with larger patent portfolios were more likely to
engage in strategic patenting, which may be an endogenous effect: firms
may amass larger patent portfolios because they see value in a cross-
licensing strategy, or they may learn about the value of cross-licensing only
after acquiring a relatively large portfolio. (See Fig. 4 below.)
270. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (low revenue, high
revenue): prevent others from copying (0.04, 0.05); improve chances of securing investment
(0.05, 0.06); obtain licensing revenues (0.07, 0.07); improve chances/quality of liquidity event
(0.05, 0.06); prevent patent infringement actions against us (0.06, 0.06); improve negotiating
position (0.06, 0.06); and enhance company's reputation (0.05, 0.05).
271. The differences between high- and low-revenue firms for improving negotiating
position were not statistically significant.
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Of course, not only firm size may have an effect on strategic patent-
ing; industry differences may also play an important role.272 Focusing on
specific industries shows that biotechnology, medical device, and hard-
ware firms rated strategic patenting as more important than software and
Internet firms did. (See Fig. 2 above.) These results are consistent with
Davis's finding that European biotechnology firms tend to engage in stra-
tegic patenting more than other types of firms. 273 Yet, interestingly,
biotechnology firms rated improving negotiating position more highly
274than medical device firms did (see Fig. 2 above), while there was no sta-
tistically significant difference in their ratings for defensive patenting. This
result may be attributable to the relative importance of licensing in the
biotechnology industry, a topic to which we turn next.
D. Obtaining Licensing Revenue is the Least Important
Reason for Patenting
A number of commentators have opined that licensing intellectual
property is important for firms that lack substantial complementary as-
sets, such as production and marketing capabilities.27' Because startups
typically do not hold such complementary assets-and, hence, do not
have the same internal resources to commercialize their inventions as do
large firms-one would expect earning licensing revenues would play a
more important role in startups' patenting decisions. Indeed, according
to a recent study by Ashish Arora and Marco Ceccagnoli, effective pat-
enting is more likely to encourage licensing by firms that possess fewer
complementary assets.276
Nonetheless, our respondents reported that the importance of secur-
ing licensing revenue was significantly lower than the other reasons,
falling between "slightly important" and "moderately important." While
this finding might seem to conflict with the PatVal study of European
patentees, which showed that small firms were much more likely to pat-
277ent to secure licensing revenue than large ones, when we segment our
respondent firms by total revenue, high-revenue entrepreneurial firms
report that licensing is significantly less important to patenting when
compared with low-revenue firms, suggesting that the smallest of the
272. See BRONWYN HALL & ROSEMARIE ZIEDONIs. THE PATENT PARADOx REVISITED:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PATENTING IN THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY. 1979-1995,
32 RAND J. EcON. 101, 105 (2001).
273. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
274. This difference was statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.
275. See, e.g., Teece. supra note 51, at 285-86; Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli. Pat-
ent Protection, Complementary Assets, and Finns' Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52
MGMT. Sa. 293, 293 (2006).
276. See Arora & Ceccagnoli. supra note 275. at 293.
277. See GAMBARDELLA ET AL., supra note 194, at 39.
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small are more likely to rate this reason highly.27 8 (See Fig. 3 above.) We
also find that although licensing is not as important for our respondents
relative to other reasons to patent, when we compare our responses with
those from the large firm surveys (an approach admittedly fraught with
problems), it appears that this driver of patenting is more important for
smaller firms than larger ones.279 Moreover, a non-trivial number of our
respondents generate all or nearly all of their revenue from licensing.
Thus, while our finding that generating licensing revenue is the least im-
portant driver of patenting is somewhat unexpected, our results are not
inconsistent with studies showing that licensing takes on more promi-
nence for firms lacking complementary assets.
We also find significant inter-industry differences regarding the util-
ity of patents for licensing. Specifically, biotechnology firms place much
greater emphasis on patenting to obtain licensing revenue than all other
firms, including medical device, (venture-backed) hardware, and soft-
ware and Internet firms (with these latter segments all roughly clustered
together in their rankings).280 (See Fig. 2 above.) These differences may
stem from the difficulties startup biotechnology firms face in commer-
cializing their inventions. Indeed, it is well-documented that unlike many
startups in other industries, biotechnology startups typically form alli-
ances with incumbents to clear costly regulatory hurdles and bring their
innovations to market, thus suggesting that patenting and licensing may
generally play a different role in the peculiar industrial organization
characteristic of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors.28'
Interestingly, firms that had filed larger numbers of patent applica-
tions did not rate obtaining licensing revenue as any more important a
driver for filing than firms with smaller portfolios. (See Fig. 4.)
278. This difference was statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
279. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 47 fig.7.
280. Biotechnology firms showed statistically significant differences from medical de-
vice, hardware, and software firms at a 99% confidence level.
281. See Riitta Katila et al., Swimming with Sharks: Technology Ventures, Defense
Mechanisms and Corporate Relationships, 53 MGMT. Sa. 295 (2008); Luis Diestre & Nandini
Rajagopalan, Are All "Sharks" Dangerous? New Biotechnology Ventures and Partner Selec-
tion in R&D Alliances (June 2008) (working paper) (on file with authors). Although medical
device firms usually must undergo regulatory approval to market their products, because these
firms often rely in large part upon the proven safety of older-but "substantially equivalent"-
devices to pass regulatory muster, as well as for other reasons, their costs are generally not as
great as those for firms undergoing approval for new biotechnology products. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e(b)(1)(B) (2007) (providing exemptions from pre-market approval for Class III medical
devices that are "substantially equivalent" to pre-existing devices); H.R. REP. No. 101-808, at
14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, 6307 (noting that 80% of new Class Ill
devices were introduced to the market through the § 510(k) exemption process); Jennifer A.
Henderson & John J. Smith, Realizing the Potential for Biomarkers in Imaging: Background
and Legal Basis, 60 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 516 (2005) (remarking that the costs of regula-
tory approval are lower for medical devices than biotechnology products).
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FIGURE 4
REASONS TO PATENT BY NUMBER OF FILED PATENTS AND
122APPLICATIONS. How IMPORTANT OR UNIMPORTANT HAVE
THE FOLLOWING BEEN TO YOUR COMPANY IN SEEKING
PATENT PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES?
Prevent Others from Copying 3.46 3.69
Improve Chances of Securing Investment
Obtain Licensing Revenues
Improve Chances/Quality of Liquidity
3.11
2.4
2.38
3.07
3.4
3.35
Prevent Patent Infringement Actions 2.823.02
Improve Negotiating Position 2.843.02
Enhance Company's Reputation 3.11
1 2 3 4
m 0-4 Patents a >4 Patents
(1=Not At All Important, 2=Slightly Important, 3=Moderately Important, 4=Very Important)
Yet, there were notable differences between the groups regarding
other motivations to patent. In particular, for the top patent filers, prevent-
ing copying is a somewhat more important reason to patent than for firms
with low patenting rates. 283 Nonetheless, even the bottom half found pre-
venting copying somewhere between "moderately" and "very" important.
There is a more noticeable difference in terms of signaling. For firms with
fewer numbers of patents filed, using patents to improve their chances of
securing investment or a liquidity event are substantially lower than for
firms filing a greater number of patents.284 Again, however, even for the
lower division, these forms of patenting remained nearly "moderately"
important. Another noticeable difference arises in the use of patents to
improve negotiating position, such as in cross-licensing. Although we
showed earlier that startup firms engage in strategic patenting in ways
282. The sample is divided into cohorts at the median number of patents and applica-
tions reported to have been filed by respondent firms after founding (i.e., not including patents
or applications filed by founders later acquired by the firm). The standard error of the mean
for each response is as follows (low patenting, high patenting): prevent others from copying
(0.05, 0.04); improve chances of securing investment (0.06, 0.05); obtain licensing revenues
(0.07, 0.06); improve chances/quality of liquidity event (0.06, 0.05); prevent patent infringe-
ment actions against us (0:06, 0.06); improve negotiating position (0.06, 0.05); and enhance
company's reputation (0.05, 0.05).
283. This difference was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
284. These differences were also statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
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not unlike large firms, as we mentioned, firms filing more patents are
2851
more likely to use patents for strategic reasons.
Notably, other than for licensing, none of the responses is less than
"moderately" important for firms with below-the-median levels of patent
filing. As such, we believe that some of our most salient findings in this
Article regarding the use of patents by startups-namely, the importance
of patents to prevent copying, the use of patents to secure capital and
improve exits, and the strategic use of patents for enhancing negotiating
position-remain robust to criticisms that our responses may not be cap-
turing those companies that are less interested in patents. Indeed, as we
discuss in the next section, many of our respondent firms had never filed
for a patent.
E. Cost Is the Major Hindrance to Startup Patenting
A sizable percentage of respondents held no patents or applications
whatsoever. For the Dun & Bradstreet firms, nearly 60% had never filed for
a patent-of software firms, roughly 75% had never filed, though that same
percentage of biotechnology firms had filed. For the venture-backed, Ven-
tureXpert firms, only 18% had not filed-with 32% of software firms and
4% of biotechnology firms holding no patents or applications. Some of
these non-filers-such as many of the small software service and "consult-
ing" shops in our respondent sample-might simply not innovate, at least in
ways that are potentially patentable (although even non-patenting firms gen-
erally reported that innovation was important to their business strategies).2 6
On the other hand, firms that regularly patent may decide to forgo filing for
some of their innovations. As we discussed earlier, because hindrances to
startup patenting had not previously been thoroughly investigated with em-
pirical data, we inquired of our sample firms why they decided not to patent
their most recent major technology innovation.
Figure 5 shows the results from nearly 1,000 respondents.287 By asking
the respondent to report on its most recent major technology innovation,
we intended to secure a sample of discrete decisions about whether to pat-
ent potentially patentable innovations. By far, the top reason to forgo
patenting on this sample of major innovations was the cost of obtaining
285. Strategic reasons-namely, improving negotiating and preventing suits-showed
differences at a 95% confidence level.
286. But cf supra Part I.K.1 (noting that many small firms may mistakenly believe their
inventions are unpatentable).
287. This question could be answered by respondents regardless of whether they had
filed for a patent. Because respondents could check one or more of these selections, the per-
centages for each reason do not add up to 100%.
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the patent, closely followed by the cost of enforcing the patent. :1 These
results are similar to those found in the Small Business Administration
survey conducted in 1998 of small firms, which listed the same reasons as
the most important for forgoing patenting.23 Additionally, these motiva-
tions accord with the finding reported in the Carnegie Mellon study that
the smaller firms in their (generally large-firm) sample showed a signifi-
cantly greater sensitivity to the costs of filing and enforcing patents.290
FIGURE 5
REASONS FOR FORGOING PATENT PROTECTION.2 9 1
FOR THAT SAME UNPATENTED INNOVATION, WHICH IF ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING INFLUENCED YOUR COMPANY'S DECISION NOT TO PATENT?
No Need for Legal Protection 17.50%
Believed Technology Was Not Patentable 37.54%
Cost of Enforcing Patent 45.49%
Believed Trade Secret Was Adequate Protection 35.63%
Competitors Could Invent Around Patent 44.64%
Cost of Getting Patent 56.63%
Did Not Want to Disclose Information 34.99%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
As noted earlier, while the ease of inventing around was a prominent
reason reported by large companies to forgo patenting in previous sur-
veys, the difficulties and costs of acquiring and enforcing patents tended
not to be.292 Given our earlier findings documenting the relative impor-
tance of patenting in startups, not only for maintaining supracompetitive
288. The difference between the reported percentage for the costs of acquiring and the
costs of enforcing the patent was statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. The costs
of enforcing the patent and the ease of inventing around the patent did not show statistically
significant differences from one another, but they were statistically significantly different from
the next reported reason to a 99% confidence level.
289. See CORDES ET AL., supra note 191, at 55-58.
290. See Cohen et al., supra note 62, at 15-16.
291. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows: did not want to
disclose information (1.51%); cost of getting patent (1.57%); competitors could invent around
patent (1.57%); believed trade secret protection was adequate (1.51%); cost of enforcing pat-
ent (1.57%); believed technology was not patentable (1.53%); no need for legal protection
(1.20%).
292. See supra Part II.C.
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profits but also for strategic reasons (especially for increasing bargaining
power), the barriers created for entrepreneurs by the high costs of patent
prosecution and enforcement arguably present a serious public policy
concern. Moreover, high costs are no chimera for these startup firms:
another of our survey questions revealed that the average out-of-pocket
cost for a respondent firm to acquire its most recent patent was over
$38,000. This figure is substantially higher than the averages for patent
prosecution reported in the literature, which vary from a low of $10,000
to a high of $30,000.293
To be certain, not all firms were equally sensitive to the cost of filing
or enforcement. For instance, the Dun & Bradstreet respondents were
much more likely to list cost as the primary disincentive to patenting
than the venture-backed VentureXpert respondents. (See Fig. 7 below.)
Indeed, as a group, while the VentureXpert firms listed filing costs (in-
cluding attorneys' fees) as the main reason for not patenting, the costs of
enforcement trailed behind the ability of others to design around the pat-
ent. These differences may be attributable to the greater capitalization of
venture-backed firms. When firms are segmented by annual revenue,
statistically significant differences appear between the highest and low-
est quartile in the cost of acquiring a patent as well as the top-half and
bottom-half in the cost of enforcing a patent. Older firms were much less
sensitive to the cost of acquiring and enforcing patents than younger
firms.294 (See Fig. 9 below.) In addition, respondents that reported that
patents were fairly effective at allowing them to appropriate value from
their innovations-such as biotechnology and medical device firms-
were less likely to be sensitive to filing and enforcement costs than firms
295
stating otherwise -Such as those in the software and Internet indus-
try.29 (See Fig. 6 below.)
293. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Ofice, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495, 1498-99 (2001) (estimating the cost of prosecuting a patent to issuance as between
$10,000 and $30,000); see also ECONOMIC SURVEY, supra note 35, at 27 (reporting average
attorneys' fees for prosecuting an original patent application, filing one amendment, and issu-
ing an allowed application as between $10,000 and $20,000, depending on the complexity of
the technology).
294. These differences were statistically significant at 99% and 95% confidence levels,
respectively.
295. It also accords with recent work showing that software litigation may be more
costly than other technological fields, because of the abstract nature of software patent claims.
See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 110, at 164; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts
or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1760 (2009)
("By contrast, we have a much harder time defining machines in words, and a still harder time
writing words that clearly delineate the scope of software inventions."). Another likely factor
explaining these differences is that software firms tended to be smaller than other firms in our
sample.
296. These differences were statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. As would
be expected, companies with fewer patents were noticeably more sensitive to the cost of get-
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Yet, the greater cost-sensitivity of our small-company respondents as
compared with those in the large-firm surveys may not be merely a result
of more binding capital constraints. As we stated above, our respondents
reported significantly higher patent prosecution costs than those for more
established firms. In unstructured interviews we conducted with a sam-
ple of respondents, one executive at a venture-backed semiconductor
firm stated that startups often pay significantly more than incumbents,
because startups (1) tend to file for patents on inventions that are more
important to the company's core business model than those filed by es-
tablished firms; (2) usually use outside, instead of in-house, counsel for
patent prosecution; and (3) often have difficulty monitoring outside
counsel to limit overall costs.297 Indeed, a non-trivial percentage of re-
spondents-about 10%-listed cost as the only barrier to filing for a
patent. 298 Additionally, when asked to indicate the "most important" rea-
son for not filing, more than one-third of the respondents selected either
the cost of acquiring or enforcing the patent.299 Finally, as a converse ar-
gument, a relatively low percentage of firms-about 18%-reported no
need for legal protection as a reason for not filing, thus suggesting that
startups are interested in obtaining the protections that patents can af-
ford.3a) As Kingston's study of European firms revealed, these high costs
might not merely prevent startups from appropriating the value of their
ting and enforcing a patent. These differences were statistically significant at the 99% and
95% confidence levels, respectively.
297. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Semiconductor Company Executive (Feb.
20, 2009).
298. Despite the high costs of patenting and enforcement acting as a deterrent to filing
for patents-for the companies that did patent, especially for software companies-
respondents did not report that the patenting process was terribly disruptive to their overall
innovation process. In a separate survey question, firms in all industries, including software,
reported that patenting was only a little more than "slightly disruptive" on average to their
technology teams. Importantly, these results appear to contradict Mann's anecdotal finding
that patents substantially distract startup software firms "from the central task of designing
and deploying a product." Mann, supra note 27, at 962, 983.
299. Specifically, respondents identified the following as the most important reasons for
not patenting their last innovation: cost of acquiring the patent (26.00%); did not believe tech-
nology was patentable (20.92%); did not want to disclose information (15.84%); ease of
inventing around the patent (12.41%); cost of enforcing the patent (10.52%); no need for legal
protection (7.33%); and believed that trade secret protection was adequate (6.97%).
300. Software firms found "no need for legal protection" more often than other firms,
but somewhat surprisingly, biotechnology and medical device firms report this motivation
more often than venture-backed hardware firms. See infra Figure 6. The difference between
software and other firms was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, and the
difference between hardware and medical firms was statistically significant at the 90% confi-
dence level. These findings could partly reflect that thcse healthcare-related firms are already
cooperating with potential competitors through licensing or joint venture agreements, obviat-
ing the direct need for patent protection in certain instances. See infra note 320 and
accompanying text.
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innovations via patents, but could deter R&D in the first instance-
preventing us from knowing with certainty what innovations society did
not realize.' Thus, we strongly believe that the significant barrier pre-
sented by the high costs of prosecuting and enforcing patents by startups
warrants further analysis and, potentially, remedial policy action.
F. The Perceived Narrow Scope of Patents
and High Patenting Thresholds
Another set of reasons to forgo patenting related to our respondents'
perceptions about the effectiveness of the patent system. First, nearly
45% of respondents stated that the ability of competitors to design
around a potential patent influenced their decision to forgo patenting.
Second, nearly 38% of respondents reported not filing because they be-
lieved the innovation was not patentable. (See Fig. 5 above.) Both
findings were somewhat surprising in view of recent criticism that (1)
the courts too often uphold patent claims of overly broad scope,302 and
(2) the U.S. Patent Office too frequently grants patents of questionable
inventiveness.' 3
There are at least two possible explanations for these findings. One,
the criticism of the courts and the Patent Office could simply reflect at-
tribution bias that results from wrongly inferring that the relatively small
number of "bad patents" that issue and are later upheld in litigation rep-
resent the universe of issued patents. On this score, only about 70% of
all original patent applications-either directly or through a continuation
or divisional application-ultimately mature into a patent.3 '2 Thus, there
is at least one non-trivial barrier that prevents every application from
becoming an issued patent-the patent examination process. Addition-
ally, concerns about overbreadth in patent scope have mainly been made
301. See KINGSTON, supra note 187, at 9 (finding that the cost of litigation had a "very
big" effect on the decisions of small firms to invest in invention for 13% of respondents and a
"significant" effect for 36%).
302. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 110, at 66-68 (describing biotechnology and
software patent claims that greatly exceeded the scope of the disclosed inventions); Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Ofice, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1499-1500 (2001)
(explaining how the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office is unable to adequately examine each
patent and grants many broad patents as a result).
303. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and
How Should We Change?-The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 63 &
n.2 (2006) (collecting recent articles criticizing the Patent Office for issuing "so-called 'bad'
or improvidently granted patents"); supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.
304. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58
EMORY L.J. 181, 187, 193 (2008) (reporting a "grant rate" range for a one-month sample of
applications to be roughly 73%).
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in the context of software and communications patents."" Indeed, the
Federal Circuit recently heard arguments en banc to weaken disclosure
standards that mainly apply to biotechnology patents.' Thus, concerns
from startups about high patentability thresholds and narrow scope may
reflect accurate perceptions of the system in practice.
On the other hand, it could be the case that startups are relatively unso-
phisticated and misperceive the ease of garnering a patent, particularly one
with claims of broad scope. In this regard, when responses are segmented by
industry, although medical device firms were the most likely to list the ease
of designing around the patent as a reason for not patenting, it is software,
not biotechnology, firms that follow. (See Fig. 6 below.)
FIGURE 6
REASONS FOR FORGOING PATENT PROTECTION BY INDUSTRY. 07
FOR THAT SAME UNPATENTED INNOVATION, WHICH IF ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING INFLUENCED YOUR COMPANY'S DECISION NOT TO PATENT?
Did Not Want to Disclose Information
Cost of Geting Patent 6350%
Competitors Could Invent Around Patent
Believed Trade Secret Was Adequate Protection
Cost of Enforcing Patent
Believed Technology Was Not Patentable
No Need For Legal Protection 20 3%
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o Biotech a Medical Device a Software a Hardware
305. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note I10, at 21-24; Brian Kahin, The Software
Patent Crisis, TECH. REV. (Apr. 1, 1990), at 53, 58 (noting the problem of overbroad software
patents), available at http://kahin.people.si.umich.edu/softwarepatentcrisis.htm.
306. See ARIAD Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 2008-1248, 2009 WL 2573004
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 21, 2009) (granting en banc review on whether there is "a written description
requirement separate from an enablement requirement").
307. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (biotech, medical
device, software, hardware): did not want to disclose information (4.24%, 5.49%, 4.30%,
1.78%); cost of getting patent (4.26%, 5.33%, 4.31%, 1.99%); competitors could invent
around patent (4.25%, 5.26%, 4.32%, 2.05%); believed trade secret protection was adequate
(4.30%, 5.46%, 4.30%, 1.87%); cost of enforcing patent (4.13%, 5.07%, 4.14%, 2.06%); be-
lieved technology was not patentable (3.86%, 5.3%, 3.89%, 2.03%); no need for legal
protection (3.23%, 2.83%, 2.94%, 1.65%).
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Based on the practice experience of one of the authors, a non-trivial
share of the high percentage of software firms (about 45%) that have con-
cerns over patent breadth may simply be mistaken about how difficult it is
to garner patent claims of expansive scope. Supporting this contention is
our finding that the youngest firms, which are arguably less experienced
with the Patent Office, are comparatively more likely to forgo filing be-
cause of the perceived ability of others to design around a patent.08 The
same contention of ignorance arguably holds true for the large percentage
(42%) of software firms that believed their innovations were not pat-
entable.3 0 It is possible, too, that among software engineers, a positive
response to the "not patentable" option could refer to philosophic beliefs
about what should be patentable and not objective beliefs about what is in
fact patentable.
However, there are several arguments against these contentions. First,
the finding that younger firms were more concerned about patent scope
could simply reflect more. "incremental"-as opposed to "disruptive"-
innovation by older firms."o Specifically, incremental innovation is harder
to invent around, since doing so would require replicating other product
components associated with the incremental innovation."' Second, soft-
ware patent applications, especially those in the "business method" area,
have had relatively high rejection rates since at least 2006.312 This result is
also consistent with Davis's finding that Danish software firms reported
avoiding patenting, because they did not feel their inventions were pat-
entable."' Third, there were no significant differences in the perceived
ability to invent around a patent or the patentability of the innovation-at-
hand when segmenting respondent firms by the size of their patent
portfolio. This result suggests that companies with less experience in pat-
enting share similar views with more experienced firms about patenting
308. This difference was statistically significant at a 90% confidence level.
309. Biotechnology and medical device firms significantly differed from hardware and
software firms at the 99% confidence level.
310. See generally JOE TIDD ET AL., MANAGING INNOVATION: INTEGRATING TECHNO-
LOGICAL, MARKET AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE §§ 1.3, 1.6 (2001) (discussing both
incremental and disruptive innovations).
311. We thank Colleen Chien for this suggestion.
312. See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 304, at 196-97 (finding lower grant rates in the
Computer Architecture, Software & Information Security technology "art units" than other art
units); Dennis Crouch, Evidence Based Prosecution V. Business Method Rejections, PAT-
ENTLY-O (Oct. 22, 2006), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/10/evidence-based_2.html
(showing final rejection rates of over 50% for business method patents compared against 25%
for the general population). Recently, however, it appears that grant rates in the business
method art unit are increasing. See Dennis Crouch, The Business Method Art Units,
PATENTLY-O (July 18, 2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/07/business-method-
patents.html.
313. See Davis, supra note 168, at 11.
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thresholds and patent strength. In sum, just what share of startups are
knowledgeable or ignorant about patentability standards and claim
scope-and, related, how much of the criticism of the patent system is
hyperbole-cannot be determined from our data and is deserving of fur-
ther study.
G. Unwillingness to Disclose Trade Secrets
The last set of reasons to forgo patenting revolves around the reluctance
of firms to disclose their (trade) secrets. As shown in Figure 2, respondents
listed not wanting to disclose information as a reason for not patenting about
35% of the time. In this regard, if a firm makes reasonable efforts to prevent
the disclosure of confidential information that provides it a commercial ad-
vantage, the firm is typically protected by trade secret law-so long as the
company is aware of this protection and the process for securing it.314 We
note that a nearly identical percentage of firms (36%) indicated that a reason
not to file was the adequacy of trade secrecy law.' Moreover, that relatively
few firms stated that they did not need any legal protection for their innova-
tions indicates that trade secrecy law may play an important role beyond the
non-legal protection measures firms can take to ensure secrecy.
The relative frequency of these reasons tends to track the large firm sur-
veys, though the desire to prevent disclosure appears to be generally more of
a deterrent to patenting for large firms than for our respondents. Part of this
difference reflects our survey's heavy focus on software and Internet firms,
for which reluctance to disclose played a less significant deterrent role
compared with other industries. 6 This result may reflect the historically
weak disclosure requirements at the U.S. Patent Office for software pat-
ents-particularly the ability of applicants to retain source code and other
important know-how from patent applications.' 7 Or there may be other
technology- or labor-market characteristics at work that relate to informa-
tion flow in the software and Internet space, including the notoriously short
product life cycles in software, in which the disclosure from marketing a
product may come prior to the usual 18-month patent application publica-
tion requirement.""
314. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Act §§ 1-2 (1985).
315. The responses for these reasons were not statistically significantly different from
one another, but they were from the next reason-no need for legal protection-at a 99%
confidence level.
316. These differences were statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
317. See Gregory J. Maier, Software Protection - Integrating Patent, Copyright and
Trade Secret Law, 69 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 151, 163-65 (1987) (noting that pat-
ent law does not require the disclosurc of software code and that "there is sometimes
motivation . . . to obtain broad patent protection and yet retain significant trade secret protec-
tion").
318. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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Do other company characteristics, apart from industry, play an impor-
tant role in the reluctance to disclose information? For instance, when the
respondent firms are segmented by data source, the VentureXpert venture-
backed firms were more reluctant to disclose information than the Dun &
Bradstreet firms, which are generally smaller and not venture-backed. (See
Fig. 7.)
FIGURE 7
REASONS FOR FORGOING PATENT PROTECTION BY DATA SOURCE.m
FOR THAT SAME UNPATENTED INNOVATION, WHICH IF ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING INFLUENCED YOUR COMPANY'S DECISION NOT TO PATENT?
Did Not Want to Disclose Information 3087%42.07%
Cost of Getting Patent 457 60.74%
Competitors Could Invent Around Patent 44.67%
Believed Trade Secret Was Adequate Protection 32 41.50%
50.50%Cost of Enforcing Patent 36.89%
Believed Technology Was Not Patentable 36.0%
No Need For Legal Protection 1095 21.31%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
aD&B mVX
Indeed, at first blush, that smaller, non-venture-backed firms are less
motivated by a desire to avoid disclosure of their information in patents than
larger ones is puzzling. One would expect that smaller firms have more to
fear from larger competitors using their otherwise proprietary information.
On the other hand, as industry-segmented results show, most of the reported
difference stems from the biotechnology firms, which disproportionately
leave process inventions unpatented. (See Fig. 6 above.) Thus, these differ-
ences may reflect the underlying dynamics of the types of technologies
smaller, non-venture-backed firms choose to leave unpatented. Additionally,
given that very small biotechnology firms are known to enter into joint ven-
tures and other cooperative relationships with larger firms,320 it could simply
319. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (Dun & Bradstreet,
VentureXpert): did not want to disclose information (1.89%, 2.49%); cost of getting patent
(2.00%, 2.53%); competitors could invent around patent (2.04%, 2.52%); believed trade secret
protection was adequate (1.91%, 2.49%); cost of enforcing patent (2.05%, 2.44%); believed
technology was not patentable (1.99%, 2.45%); no need for legal protection (1.68%, 1.64%).
320. See Gregory B. Abbott, Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Licensing and Joint
Ventures, 514 PLI/PAT. 37, 54-57 (1998).
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be the case that the information these firms would disclose in a patent is
already known by potential competitors. Moreover, the Dun & Bradstreet
firms saw less of a need for legal protection than the VentureXpert firms,
which could also partially explain the findings on the reluctance of the latter
121firms to disclose. In sum, while more sophisticated statistical analysis is
necessary to disentangle the role of firm size, venture funding, and technol-
ogy in the willingness to disclose, it appears that other factors are
influencing the reported variations.
Whether the innovation is a product or process raises other interesting
differences regarding the disclosure of proprietary information. We seg-
mented our data by whether the respondent indicated that the last invention
for which they chose to forgo patent protection was a product or a process
(or whether that question was not applicable). (See Fig. 8.)
FIGURE 8
REASONS TO FORGO PATENTING BY INVENTION TYPE.32
FOR THE SAME UNPATENTED INNOVATION, WHICH IF ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING INFLUENCED YOUR COMPANY'S DECISION NOT TO PATENT?
Did Not Want to Disclose Information 32.27%41.04%
Cost of Getting Patent 54.01% 66.40%
Competitors Could Invent Around Patent 46%
Believed Trade Secret Was Adequate Protection 41.27%
Cost of Enforcing Patent 44.34%
Believed Technology Was Not Patentable 37%
No Need for Legal Protection 1.7%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
E3 Process a Product
321. Dun & Bradstreet and VentureXpert firms showed statistically significant differ-
ences from one another in not wanting to disclose information, the costs of acquiring patents.,
the belief that trade secret protection was adequate, the costs of enforcing the patent, and the
belief that there was no need for legal protection. Each was significantly different at a 99% or
greater confidence level.
322. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (process, product):
did not want to disclose information (2.32%, 2.38%); cost of getting patent (2.35%, 2.39%);
competitors could invent around patent (2.35%, 2.53%); believed trade secret protection was
adequate (2.31%. 2.40%); cost of enforcing patent (2.34%, 2.53%); believed technology was
not patentable (2.28%, 2.43%); no need for legal protection (1.70%, 1.65%).
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As expected, trade secrecy was viewed as a more adequate form of pro-
tection than patenting for process and, to a lesser degree, product
123innovations. This result likely stems from the characteristic that processes,
324
especially internal ones, are generally easier to keep secret than products.
For similar reasons, respondents were less concerned with fear of disclosure
for processes than products in patent applications.32' These findings are gen-
erally consistent with those of the Yale study, in which large firms reported
that they were less willing to disclose process innovations.
Unlike our results, the Yale study also found that firms with process
innovations were less willing to patent than product innovators because
of difficulties of enforcement. 327 However, the Yale study was conducted
three decades ago and focused on large, publicly traded firms, which
were likely less sensitive to enforcement costs than startups. In our 2008
study, biotechnology firms-which are generally larger and better capi-
talized than our average respondent-were more likely to report that
their last unpatented innovation was a process than other types of firms.
If biotechnology firms, with access to spare capital, are more capable of
enforcing their patents in court, and legal regimes have changed over
time, it is understandable that a lower percentage of process innovators
reported concerns about enforcement in deciding to forgo patenting.
However, all else being equal, one would expect that process patents are
more difficult to litigate, because of problems in proving infringement.328
Although older firms are generally larger than younger ones, the old-
est of our respondent firms were more willing to disclose information in
a patent than the youngest firms, a finding that seemingly runs contrary
to our findings on firm size.3 29 (See Fig. 9.)
323. This difference was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
324. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 371,
396 (2002); Teece, supra note 51, at 290.
325. This difference was statistically significant at the 95% confidence level.
326. See Levin et al., supra note 143, at 806, t.6.
327. See id.
328. See Eisenberg, supra note 123, at 739.
329. This difference was statistically significant at a 90% confidence level. The likeli-
hood of having last not patented a product versus a process invention was virtually the same in
both the youngest and oldest companies, at 50% each. The younger quartile was, however,
more likely to be populated by biotechnology startups (17.7% vs. 13.4%), which may account
for some of the observed difference.
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FIGURE 9
REASONS TO FORGO PATENTING By FIRM AGE.330
FOR THAT SAME UNPATENTED INNOVATION, WHICH IF ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING INFLUENCED YOUR COMPANY'S DECISION NOT TO PATENT?
Did Not Want to Disclose Information 34.70%
31..70%
Cost of Getting Patent 49.40%
49.40%
Competitors Could Invented Around Patent 41.0%
Believed Trade Secret Was Adequate Protection 36.30%
Cost Of Enforcing Patent 37.10%
Believed Technology Was Not Patentable 32.20%
No Need For Legal Protection 18.40%18.10%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
m <3.8 Years 4 >8.7 Years
One might surmise that older firms are more likely to patent incre-
mental-as opposed to revolutionary-inventions, which arguably
would lead to less of a concern with disclosure .
Finally, firms with comparatively more patent filings were more
likely not to patent because of a reluctance to disclose information from
their last major innovation in a patent."' 2 Similarly, these same firms were
more likely to forgo filing a patent for that last innovation because they
believed trade secret protection was adequate."' Although these results
might appear counterintuitive, it may be the case that firms with more
patents are more likely to patent a greater share of their innovations;
thus, we have no way of knowing with certainty how long ago the "most
recent" unpatented innovation was generated in the company. A
company patenting 90% of its major innovations may make the non-
patenting decision relatively rarely. Accordingly, when these firms
330. The standard error of the mean for each response is as follows (<3.8 years, >8.7
years): did not want to disclose information (3.09%, 3.03%); cost of getting patent (3.17%,
3.25%); competitors could invent around patent (3.24%, 3.21 %); believed trade secret protec-
tion was adequate (3.13%, 3.13%); cost of enforcing patent (3.24%, 3.15%); believed
technology was not patentable (3.03%, 3.23%); no need for legal protection (2.51%, 2.51 %).
331. One might also hypothesize that older firms have a greater ability to withstand
competition, but if that were so. then arguably these firms would have reported using patents
less to prevent copying than younger firms, which we did not find.
332. This difference was statistically significant at the 90% confidence level.
333. This difference was statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.
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affirmatively decide not to patent, fear of disclosing sensitive informa-
tion may be more salient a reason than for firms that patent a smaller
share of their innovations. Additionally, this difference may be driven by
the technological profiles of the innovations at these firms, which in turn
influence what the firms choose to patent, and not to patent.
CONCLUSION
Until the study presented here, the collective understanding of the
drivers of patenting by entrepreneurial firms was primarily a variety of
constructs built from scattered anecdotes and patent law theory, with a
few lesser known empirical studies of limited sample sizes contributing
on the fringes. In many cases, commentators and policymakers simply
relied upon studies of large firms to infer the characteristics of startups.
Despite these methodologically flawed approaches, policymakers have
used these constructs to fashion applicable laws, generally strengthening
patent rights over the last few decades.
The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey-the first of its kind to target a
large sample of small, startup firms in a variety of technology-intensive
industries-casts doubt on many facets of these constructs. Most impor-
tantly, we find that startups-like large firms-are primarily motivated
to file for patents to prevent copying by competitors, presumably in or-
der to earn supernormal profits. This finding holds across industries, firm
ages, patent portfolio size, and a variety of other important characteris-
tics. Additionally, licensing intellectual property to other firms for
ultimate commercialization is not viewed by most entrepreneurial firms
as comparatively important to patenting. Thus, anecdotal reports that
startup firms do not use patents in the traditional sense to exclude com-
petitors should be reconsidered in light of our findings. Nonetheless, we
do find important inter-industry differences, with biotechnology and
medical device firms rating the exclusionary nature of patents as signifi-
cantly more important relative to software firms. As such, policies that
strengthened patent rights in the software industry may have had unin-
tended negative consequences not only, as reported, for incumbents but
also for startups, and we plan to explore this concern in later work.
Second, consistent with the anecdotal accounts and the previously
limited empirical data, we find that entrepreneurial firms rely heavily on
patenting to raise financing, to improve their chances and the quality of
acquisition or going public, and to enhance their overall company and
product image-all of which may support what is often termed a "sig-
naling" theory of patents. This affirmation of the anecdotal literature is
important, because the use of patents for financing is much less
Patenting by Entrepreneurs
pronounced in large firms. As such, we provide robust data showing that
recent, alternative theories of patents as "signals" may have more force
than previously believed.
Third, we make the novel finding that entrepreneurial firms of all
ages, sizes, and technologies appear to engage in the so-called "strate-
gic" use of patents just like large, incumbent firms. These strategies
include using patents for defensive reasons, such as to prevent patent
infringement suits, and to enhance bargaining power, such as in one-way
or cross-licensing negotiations. Earlier reports had implicitly assumed
that these sorts of strategic uses would not be important to startup
firms-at least outside of the biotechnology industry-because these
companies were not prone to the same kinds of offensive litigation and
licensing threats as larger, incumbent firms. Even the youngest respon-
dent firms in our survey declared these reasons salient.
Despite the diverse drivers of patenting by entrepreneurs, we found
that startup firms are more price-sensitive than large firms to the costs of
acquiring and enforcing patents. By far, the dominant factors deterring
the patenting of entrepreneurial innovation are these costs. Given the
strong motivations of startups to patent to secure financing and for stra-
tegic uses vis-A-vis incumbents, these high costs raise serious policy
concerns. In particular, cost asymmetries between startups and incum-
bents could very well result in the misallocation of capital and an overall
dampening of innovation by new firms. Because startup firms appear to
innovate at greater rates per R&D dollar than large firms, these signifi-
cant cost barriers could have substantial, unrealized effects in the
innovation economy. As such, we recommend further research into the
extent of the problem, as well as more analysis of potential solutionse to
normalize effective barriers to patenting.
In sum, by gathering and reporting targeted responses from numer-
ous startups-not only in the aggregate but also segmented by a variety
of firm characteristics-the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey is able to pro-
vide new insights into the drivers of patenting by entrepreneurs. For an
important class of economic agents, we can now provide empirically
334. Suggested approaches have included providing tax credits for patent-related ex-
penses for small firms, see Paul R. Michel & Henry R. Nothhaft, Op-Ed, Inventing Our Way
Out of Joblessness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/08/06/opinion/06nothhaft.html (recommending a proposal suggested by Ted Sichelman
whereby "a tax credit of up to $19,000" would be provided to small businesses "for every
patent they receive"), and significantly raising the patent filing fees for large entities, perhaps
on a graduated basis, or the installation of a registration system, whereby inventors simply
register specifications of their inventions, along with proposed claims, but no substantive re-
view is undertaken until suit is brought or it is requested by a third party. See Mann, supra
note 27, at 1021-22. Such a system could potentially serve important signaling and strategic
goals without imposing large filing costs on patentees. See id.
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grounded answers to the questions: What are the determinants of patent-
ing by startup technology companies? And, why don't these companies
patent their technologies?
